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In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of
federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under
cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular,
Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative
federalism programs-that combine federal and state authority in
creative ways-and has rejected the dual federalism model of
regulation-with separate spheres of state and federal authority-
that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing
dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial
rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for
current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of
authority for state agencies to implement federal law, the essence
of the anti-commandeering rule and Tenth Amendment doctrine,
and separation of powers concerns with state administration of
federal law without federal executive oversight. As Professor
Weiser explains, courts can only make clear that cooperative
federalism regulatory programs rest on a solid constitutional
foundation by forthrightly resolving these questions with doctrines
that embrace the existence of cooperative federalism. Professor
Weiser thus recommends that the courts endorse a constitutional
architecture that, following the Erie doctrine's commitment to a
cooperative judicial federalism and Albert Hirschman's model of
exit, voice, and loyalty, respects state autonomy, appreciates the
importance of allowing states to opt of federal regulatory
programs, and recognizes the value of state implementation of
cooperative federalism statutes.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. For helpful comments and
suggestions, thanks to David Barron, Stuart Benjamin, Curt Bradley, Michael Doff,
Allison Eid, Heather Gerken, Raymond Gifford, Marty Katz, Sarah Krakoff, Larry
Malone, Hiroshi Motomura, Jon Nuechterlein, Pierre Schlag, and Steve Williams. In
addition, this Article benefited from feedback at faculty colloquia at the University of
Colorado and the University of Connecticut. Finally, thanks to Chris Schulten for superb
editing and to Jane Thompson for tremendous research support.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike the case in construction, the blueprints for constitutional
architecture often are not developed until after the relevant
governmental structures are already put in place. Indeed, sometimes
the rhetorical constitution-what courts and commentators insist are
constitutional norms-deviates from the actual constitution-the
governmental structures actually in place. Ultimately, the rhetoric of
constitutional law must conform to the reality of government, but
sometimes only after considerable confusion and litigation. In today's
constitutional law of federalism, the tension continues to build
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between the constitutional rhetoric and political reality of federal-
state relations.
The rhetoric of a "dual federalism" characterizes many of the
Supreme Court's recent statements on the constitutional law of
federalism.' In short, this vision of federal-state relations views each
jurisdiction as a separate entity that regulates in its own distinct
sphere of authority without coordinating with the other.' In reality,
however, Congress continues to enact "cooperative federalism"
regulatory programs that invite state agencies to implement federal
law In contrast to a dual federalism, cooperative federalism
envisions a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal
government and the states that allows states to regulate within a
framework delineated by federal law. In particular, modern
regulatory programs put in place across a variety of fields ranging
from nearly all environmental programs to telecommunications
regulation to health care-and those now on the drawing board,
ranging from insurance regulation to tobacco regulation 4 -all
embrace a unified federal structure that includes a role for state
implementation. Significantly, these programs neither leave state
authority unconstrained within its domain, as would a dual federalism
program, nor displace such authority entirely with a unitary federal
program, as would a preemptive federalism. Preemptive federalism,
like dual federalism, views the federal government and the states as
two separate spheres, but instead of leaving room for state regulation,
it preempts all state authority and supplants it with a unitary federal
1. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999) (emphasizing the "dual
sovereignty" nature of federalism).
2. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32
IND. L. REV. 27, 41 (1998) (arguing for a dual federalism that would prevent a state from
voluntarily administering a federal scheme that would limit its sovereignty).
3. The structure of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), which provides an
important role for state agencies subject to federal oversight and bureaucratic backup,
provides a particularly good example of a cooperative federalism regulatory program. See,
e.g., P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The
[Telecom] Act exemplifies a cooperative federalism system, in which state commissions
can exercise their expertise about the needs of the local market and local consumers, but
are guided by the provisions of the Act and by the concomitant FCC regulations.").
4. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of
State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (positing that the tobacco settlement
proposed to Congress was "in some ways" a "model of 'cooperative federalism,' crafting
interlocking roles for both state and federal authorities"); Susan Randall, Insurance
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 694-98 (1999) (anticipating a
reform of the current regime of insurance regulation that would rely on a federal or
interstate compact scheme of cooperative federalism).
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regime. By crafting a middle ground solution between the extremes
of dual federalism and preemptive federalism, Congress continues to
outstrip existing constitutional rhetoric, which envisions a separation
that does not exist in practice.
Future debates over federalism will increasingly confront the
tension between the constitutional rhetoric and political reality of
federalism. In particular, courts will confront three important
questions: (1) how to evaluate the authority of state agencies to
implement federal law, (2) how to justify and protect state autonomy
under the Tenth Amendment, and (3) how to answer separation of
powers challenges that focus on the importance of federal executive
oversight of federal law implemented by state agencies. Despite
increasing attention to the advent of cooperative federalism and the
role of a judicially enforced law of federalism,5 these potential
obstacles to a constitutional architecture for cooperative federalism
have received very little attention.
This Article proposes a constitutional architecture for
cooperative federalism that reconciles the rhetoric of current judicial
doctrine and the reality of modem political practice while
safeguarding the value of state autonomy. In short, this Article
argues that the constitutional architecture for cooperative federalism
should follow the reverse-Erie principle set forth in cases like Testa v.
Katt.6 Under this approach, states would have the authority to
implement federal law unless they had a "valid excuse" for not doing
so-i.e., implementing the federal law would require a fundamental
change in form of a state institution. Significantly, this model
recognizes both the critical value and importance of state
implementation of federal law as well as the importance of protecting
state autonomy.
A reverse-Erie model not only sheds light on when state agencies
can implement federal law (and when their state charters would
5. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (arguing for the role of state
experimentalism even within a federal regulatory regime that sets certain national
objectives); Roderick M. Hills, Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State
and Local Officials From State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999)
[hereinafter Hills, Dissecting the State] (arguing that state administration of federal law
should enjoy a value comparable to federal deference to state authority); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 215 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards] (criticizing advocates of a
judicially enforced federalism as not accounting for the influence of political parties to
protect state interests).
6. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
[Vol. 79
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prevent them from so doing), it also suggests an analytical framework
for a Tenth Amendment doctrine that protects state agencies from
being "commandeered" into a federal regulatory program. In
particular, this model suggests that states be afforded an exit right
from participation in federal regulatory regimes in order to protect
their ability to voice their concerns. Similarly, courts should
appreciate that cooperative federalism both protects states from
preemptive federalism and enables Congress to discipline federal
agencies by threatening to delegate regulatory authority to the states.
Thus, even where cooperative federalism programs delegate federal
regulatory authority to states without federal executive oversight,
such delegations should withstand any separations of power
challenge. In short, if the courts fail to develop a constitutional
conception of federal-state relations that is compatible with
cooperative federalism, then Congress may be forced to redraft a
number of important regulatory programs that rely on this concept.
Part I of this Article outlines the basic legal architecture of
cooperative federalism and discusses its recent ascendance as a
regulatory strategy for implementing public policy goals. Part UI
addresses why state agencies implementing cooperative federalism
programs can rely on the enactment of a federal statute to justify
taking action not otherwise contemplated by state law. In particular,
Part II suggests that state agencies and courts should adopt a reverse-
Erie model for determining the appropriate scope of state regulatory
authority to implement federal law. Mirroring its federal counterpart
(the Erie doctrine), reverse-Erie calls for a careful adaptation of state
procedural rules to give effect to federal substantive rights vindicated
in state court. In light of this reverse-Erie principle and Albert
Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model,7 Part IH sets forth a new
theoretical framework for Tenth Amendment doctrine. Finally, Part
IV examines the vertical separation of powers doctrine, set forth in
Printz v. United States8 and implicated by the enactment of
cooperative federalism regulatory programs, which threatens to bar
state implementation of federal law without federal executive
oversight.
7. See generally ALBERT 0. IRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (presenting a
model of institutional dynamics that emphasizes the important relationship between exit
and voice).
8. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
2001]
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I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
Courts and commentators have become familiar with the basic
model of a cooperative federalism regulatory regime in light of the
increase in such legislation over the last three decadesf Although
there is no precise definition for which regimes fit the cooperative
federalism model, the Supreme Court has suggested that this term
best describes those instances in which a federal statute provides for
state regulation or implementation to achieve federally proscribed
policy goals.1" In such instances, Congress either allows states to
regulate in compliance with federal standards or preempts state law
with federal regulation." In a variation of this model, such as that
adopted in the Medicaid Act, 2 Congress relies on a federal regulatory
agency to develop certain standards for the state agencies to follow
when implementing the federal statutory scheme that provides
federal funding to the states.3 To better appreciate the significance
9. Environmental laws provide a particularly good example of cooperative
federalism in practice. See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air
Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1197-98 (1995) (outlining the cooperative federalism nature of
most federal environmental statutes); see also John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Backs
Environmental Power-Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al (explaining the important
role played by the states in implementing federal environmental law).
10. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (describing the
cooperative federalism model). Put generally, such schemes entail "a shared federal and
state government responsibility for standard setting, funding, and enforcement." John D.
Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,58 TUL. L. REV. 299,299 (1983). A primary
feature of such schemes is that the "sharing and mutual accommodation" of regulatory
authority should be "achieved through bargaining and mutual respect for constitutional
allocations of authority." Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid, Introduction to
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 7 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). In
upholding cooperative federalism arrangements in the past, the Supreme Court has
stressed the importance of an invitation to implement federal law-with the alternative of
federal implementation-as opposed to compulsion to do so. See, e.g., FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,764 (1982) (upholding the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.)); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,288
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1305-1328 (1994))).
11. See, e.g., FERC, 456 U.S. at 765 ("Congress could have pre-empted the field, at
least insofar as private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be
invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less
intrusive scheme.").
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West Supp. 2000).
13. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36 (1981) (describing the nature of
the Medicaid program); see also Lisa B. Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Organ
Transplants: The Extent of Mandated Coverage, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185,207-
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of this emerging regulatory model, this Part outlines the rise of
cooperative federalism. In doing so, however, it does not attempt to
set out a comprehensive history of the cooperative federalism
strategy, but merely attempts to place the current political consensus
in favor of such programs in historical context.
The New Deal programs that marked the rise of the modem
administrative state called for state implementation of federal
programs mostly to distribute federal benefits-such as
unemployment insurance and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)-as opposed to the implementation of federal
economic regulation.14 Although these programs involved the sharing
of funding, as opposed to regulatory authority, they put the concept
of a cooperative federalism on the map. The Supreme Court
described AFDC, for example, as "a scheme of cooperative
federalism ... [that is] financed largely by the Federal Government,
on a matching fund basis, and is administered by the States."' 5 Such
programs insisted on a certain level of uniformity (i.e., compliance
with federal requirements), but also left important discretion with
state agencies to implement the programs within federal
requirements. 6
Beginning most notably with the environmental statutes enacted
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federal government began to
rely on state agencies to implement federal regulatory requirements. 7
08 (1997) ("The cooperative federalism relationship that the Medicaid Act sought to
encourage between the federal government and the individual state governments was
designed to accommodate change and to provide flexibility.").
14. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY
FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACr AND REFORM 1 (1984) [hereinafter ACIR
REPORT]. Some cooperative federalism regulatory-as opposed to subsidization-
programs existed even before the New Deal, let alone before the Great Society. See, e.g.,
Louis W. Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 MICH. L. REV.
752, 774 (1938) (detailing the cooperative federalism procedure relied on in the Pure Food
Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, ch. 3915,34 Stat. 768).
15. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,316 (1968).
16. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970) (recognizing state agency
discretion and making clear that state agencies implementing AFDC must comply with
federal constitutional and statutory standards).
17. Of the dozen environmental statutes passed during that time, "[a]ll of these
statutes contemplated some form of intergovernmental cooperation between the states
and the federal government in implementing the statutory program." Alfred R. Light, He
Who Pays the Piper Should Call the Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S. Environmental Law, 4
ENVrL. LAW. 779, 783 (1998). In 1965, Congress outlined the preemptive federalism path
not taken when it enacted the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), an early
environmental statute that preempted state regulation. E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution" The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. &
2001]
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This development was particularly significant because such measures
"generally depart[ed] from the New Deal model, in which national
bureaucracies directly regulated citizens and businesses in support of
national policies."' 8 In the case of the Clean Air Act,19 for example,
the statute provided for certain uniform federal standards, but left the
states with considerable flexibility in addressing the statute's
objectives. ° Similarly, under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA),21 which sought to reduce reliance on foreign fuel by
requiring that electric utilities purchase electricity from independent
power producers who operated qualifying facilities, the federal
government relied enormously on state agencies to implement federal
requirements.22
ORG. 313, 330-31 (1985) (describing the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of
1965). In 1967, however, the tide turned towards a cooperative federalism approach, and
the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), (and future measures) set minimum federal standards and
allowed the states to enact more stringent ones. Elliott, supra, at 331. In an effective
criticism of the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, David Currie explained
that "[m]inimum federal standards are admirable, and perhaps indispensable, since the
states were not doing the job. But to forbid stricter state standards is inexcusable." David
P. Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-Emption, 68
MICH. L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1970); cf. Mianus River Pres. Comm. v. Adm'r, 541 F.2d 899,
906 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[lIt is indisputable that Congress specifically declined to attempt a
preemption of the field in the area of water pollution legislation, and as much as invited
the States to enact requirements more stringent than the federal standards.").
18. Light, supra note 17, at 825.
19. 42 US.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
20. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976) (noting the discretionary
authority assigned to state agencies under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79
(1975) (same). As the Seventh Circuit explained:
[T]he Clean Air Act creates a partnership between the states and the federal
government. The state proposes, though the EPA disposes. The federal
government through the EPA determines the ends-the standards of air
quality-but Congress has given the states the initiative and a broad
responsibility regarding the means to achieve those ends through state
implementation plans and timetables for compliance .... The Clean Air Act is
an experiment in federalism, and the EPA may not run roughshod over the
procedural prerogatives that the Act has reserved to the states ... especially
when, as in this case, the agency is overriding state policy.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Mianus
River Pres. Comm., 541 F.2d at 906 ("[I]t is indisputable that Congress specifically
declined to attempt a preemption of the field in the area of water pollution legislation, and
as much as invited the States to enact requirements more stringent than the federal
standards.").
21. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16U.S.C.).
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1994); Rates for Purchases, 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (2000);
see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,750-51 (1982) (explaining that PURPA sought
to overcome both the reluctance of utilities to purchase power from non-traditional
[Vol. 79
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Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, the
movement in favor of a cooperative federalism regulatory regime
does not necessarily entail a "concentration of political powers in the
national government."'  Rather, while recognizing the need for a
federal framework, these regimes rely on existing state agencies to
administer and implement federal law.24 In viewing the enactment of
such a federal regulatory regime as a power grab, commentators fail
to appreciate that the real authority under such regimes often rests
with the states which ultimately exercise considerable discretion in
making and implementing policy?25 Thus, even where a federal
regime theoretically sets the policy, its reliance on the states to
implement the law means that the states will be very influential in
practice because they are afforded considerable discretion in
translating broad goals into reality.26 This power is significant in that,
by the federal government's own admission, it is almost always
unwilling and/or unable to take back the power to implement
cooperative federalism programs.2 7
providers and the burdens imposed on such providers by state and federal regulatory
authorities); Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Organe & Rockland, Utils., Inc., 159 F.3d
129, 135 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Though PURPA does limit the authority of state agencies in
some respects, e.g., by exempting cogeneration facilities from some regulation, PURPA
still provides a substantial role to state agencies in regulating energy contracts between
utilities and cogenerators.").
23. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1 (1992).
24. To the extent that some intergovernmental initiatives did not fully appreciate the
important role for state and local discretion, later ones have recognized that role to a
much greater extent. See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION
1 (1998) ("At a minimum [the national government's] reform initiatives [taken in the
1960s] have underscored the importance of federalism within the American system of
government. From welfare and health care to environment protection, intergovernmental
programs cannot be understood without an intergovernmental perspective."). In that
regard, the federal government's sensitivity to state concerns appears to have increased in
the mid- to late 1960s. Id. at 21 ("Backed by growing political demands from beleaguered
state and local governmental officials, such sentiments inspired a stream of
intergovernmental reform initiatives by the Johnson administration.").
25. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 31.
26. See ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND
IMPLEMENTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3 (1980) (stressing the importance of
implementation).
27. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1586 (1995) (quoting an EPAofficial as saying "'even if only a small number of delegated states returned their
programs to EPA, [the agency's] enforcement program would not be able to cope with the
new responsibilities' "); Rena I. Steinzor & William F. Permattei, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation Via the Government Performance and Results Act: Where's the
Money?, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,563, 10,573 n.105 (1998) (quoting Carol Browner, EPA
Administrator, who stated "'[t]here are some States that have seriously considered
2001]
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The federal government's increasing willingness to allow states to
superintend the implementation of federal law stems from at least
two key factors. First, state governments have become increasingly
competent in economic regulation and public administration.'
Second, the New Deal's ideological commitment to centralization
began to deteriorate, as Presidents Johnson through Clinton each
stressed (albeit for different reasons and with different emphasis) the
important role that the states play in our federal system.29 To be sure,
the changed dynamic in federal-state relations has not removed the
role for federal standards in certain key areas, but it has given rise to
returning primacy [in environmental regulation] to the Federal government. I will be very
honest with you, we don't have the resources to manage even one major State if primacy
were returned' "). Commentators frequently echo this point. See, e.g., Hodas, supra, at
1603 ("In reality, EPA-approved states have more than primary enforcement
responsibility; they have nearly exclusive governmental responsibility for [Clean Water
Act] enforcement."); Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2384 (1996) ("[T]he federal government
cannot handle all, or even most, enforcement."); Erik R. Lehtinen, Virginia as a Case
Study: EPA Should Be Willing to Withdraw NPDES Permitting Authority From Deficient
States, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 617, 630 (1999) (arguing that the
"EPA's assumption of state enforcement activities is more theoretical than real" because
the EPA lacks the necessary resources); see also Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 227 (4th
Cir. 1975) (describing the "hordes of federal employees" that would be required to
enforce the Maryland implementation plan); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971,
981 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("If we left [enforcement of the environmental laws] to the
Federal Government, we would have about everyone on the payroll of the United
States.").
28. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM 105 (1999) ("[T]he states' enhanced
professionalism, competence, and creativity are giving lie to the race-to-the-bottom notion
that only federal intervention will prevent the entire country from becoming one vast
Mississippi."); John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:
Lessons From Environmental Regulation, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 219 (1997)
("Expertise, reputational value, and human capital together may make the state
regulatory system an asset that both local officials and locally based interest groups will
fight to keep."); John Shannon & James Edwin Kee, The Rise of Competitive Federalism,
9 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 5, 15 (1989) (praising the enhanced effectiveness of state
government); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing
Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 483, 520-21 (1998)
("Through accident, external prodding, and internal agitation, the state governments have
largely managed to shed their image as venal backwaters."). See generally Mavis Mann
Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful, 509 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 83 (1990) (arguing that state governments have markedly
increased their effectiveness).
29. See David B. Walker, The Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism and the Emergence
of New Federalism 111, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 271, 271 (1996) ("The main trend [in the
modern era of federalism] was an aggressive national assertion of policy leadership by
both the political and judicial branches of the federal government, even as the localities




"a healthy appreciation" for the role that states can play in
implementing federal law.
30
Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, the benefits
of state implementation of federal law could not simply be
accomplished through decentralizing federal authority.31 As an initial
matter, the federal government lacks the political and/or fiscal will to
incur the tremendous transaction costs necessary to replace state
agencies with local field offices. Moreover, such field offices would
invariably be less accountable to local interests than a formally
elected, autonomous governmental unit.32  Emphasizing this point,
Professor Kramer explains that our constitutional commitment to
federalism should be understood as "an institutional strategy
formulated to assure a greater degree of decentralization than is ever
likely to be seen in a unitary system. '33 To be successful, this strategy
requires courts and commentators to develop a vision of federal-state
relations that both facilitates state participation in federal programs
and protects state autonomy-a constitutional architecture that
supports the governmental structures now in place.
II. STATE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL LAW AND THE REVERSE-
ERIE MODEL
A central question concerning the role of state agencies in
implementing cooperative federalism initiatives is under what
circumstances, if any, a cooperative federalism regulatory program
can justify state agency implementation of a federal law in a manner
not specifically authorized under existing state law. Due to the
relatively recent emergence of cooperative federalism regulatory (as
opposed to funding) programs, courts and commentators have yet to
30. Richard B. Stewart, Evaluating the New Deal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239,
241-42 (1998); see Martha Derthick, American Federalism: Madison's Middle Ground in
the 1980s, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 66,70 (1987) ("Among the new regulatory regimes, only
that for occupational health and safety remains overwhelmingly a federal responsibility.").
For an explanation of what circumstances necessitate the institution of uniform federal
standards, see Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and
Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1, 31-33 (1999).
31. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908-09 (1994).
32. Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 5, at 223 ("It is simply naive to imagine
that federal [officials] will routinely be willing to accommodate the full range of local
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pay particularly close attention to this issue or to develop a stable
constitutional architecture for cooperative federalism 4
Ultimately, states must decide whether to endorse cooperative
federalism as a regulatory strategy. In particular, state courts will
have the final say on whether state charters designed for different
historical circumstances-i.e., an era of dual federalism-should be
interpreted to facilitate state agency participation in federal
regulatory programs. In short, the challenge for states (or federal
courts predicting how state courts would act) is to decide how, if at
all, to justify state agency action necessary to implement cooperative
federalism regulatory programs that lie outside those actions
specifically authorized by state law.
The reverse-Erie model outlined herein provides a model for
determining when state agencies can implement federal law. At
bottom, this doctrine recognizes that federal law cannot provide a
state agency with a jurisdictional capability that is fundamentally
contrary to its charter even when that extra capability is necessary to
implement federal law. Significantly, however, the reverse-Erie
model justifies state agency implementation of federal law where
state law does not specifically authorize the agency to take the exact
measure at issue, but where the action is within the competence of the
state agency.
The reverse-Erie doctrine, whose roots go back to the early part
of the twentieth century, is most often identified with Testa v. Katt.
35
In making clear that state courts must adjudicate federal law, Testa
and its progeny call on state courts (or, under cooperative federalism
programs, state agencies)"6 to alter their usual practices to give effect
to a federal scheme (absent a "valid excuse" for not doing so).37
Under this doctrine, for example, state courts hearing Federal
34. If courts and commentators do not develop a satisfactory framework for
addressing this question, the federal government may not be able to rely on some state
agencies as effective partners in implementing cooperative federalism regulatory
programs. As Professors Michael Doff and Charles Sabel put it, "practice is outrunning
preaching, in that crucial elements of a regime of cooperative federalism are anticipated in
current legislation." Doff & Sabel, supra note 5, at 421.
35. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that Rhode Island state courts must adjudicate claims
brought under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, ch. 26, 56
Stat. 23 (repealed 1947)).
36. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 762-63 (1982) (applying Testa to state
agencies acting in an adjudicative capacity).
37. E.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1943) (holding that
state courts must "proceed in a manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under
controlling federal law would be protected").
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Employers' Liability Act (FELA)38 cases must substitute a federal
standard for their own regular pleading rules to effectuate FELA's
more generous remedial scheme.39  In so doing, the reverse-Erie
principle-like its famous namesake-provides an important model
for accommodating conflict between federal and state authority.
The reverse-Erie approach provides three distinct lessons for
federal and state courts and agencies involved in implementing
cooperative federalism programs. First, it sets forth the appropriate
analytical framework for evaluating the proper scope of state agency
authority to implement a federal regulatory program through
adjudication. Second, it offers the appropriate guide for state
agencies and courts evaluating the scope of state agency authority to
implement federal law through legislative and executive action.4'
Finally, as developed in Part III, the reverse-Erie approach embodies
a model of cooperative federalism that offers an alternative to the
dual federalism perspective that skeptically views efforts to involve
state regulatory authorities in implementing federal law and is
currently informing the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence.
To appreciate the challenge presented by state agency
implementation of cooperative federalism programs, this Part first
sets out one example of this issue as raised by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Telecom Act" or the "Act").4'
This Part then outlines and rejects three previously proposed
solutions to resolving the issue of state authority to implement federal
law. Next, this Part explains that by adopting the reverse-Erie model,
states can both protect their autonomy and support cooperative
federalism. Finally, this Part notes a formal response to the issue that
may be a second-best alternative to the reverse-Erie model, as it
would rely on a questionable legal fiction and complicate the
administration of federal regulatory programs.
38. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
39. See Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294,298-99 (1949).
40. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine, as civil
procedure professors regularly teach, instructs federal courts to follow state substantive
law, while generally applying federal procedural law, to cases arising under diversity
jurisdiction. As its name implies, reverse-Erie requires the converse analysis for federal
cases heard in state court.
41. Reverse-Erie could also serve as a guide, as opposed to a mandated approach, for
when states could take adjudicative action should the Supreme Court overrule FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
42. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
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A. The Dilemma for Cooperative Federalism
Sensitive to the limits imposed by the Supreme Court on
commandeering state agencies into a federal regulatory program,
43
the Telecom Act, like other modem cooperative federalism
programs, does not require state agencies to participate in its
implementation. Rather, the Telecom Act offers states the
opportunity to implement its essential goal of bringing competition to
local telephone markets by arbitrating disputes relating to the terms
under which new entrants will cooperate with incumbent providers.
44
If state agencies agree to superintend the development of the
"interconnection agreements" between the incumbent providers and
new entrants (which are shaped by federal law and mandate
cooperation between the incumbent provider and the new entrants),
they are expected to do so in compliance with federal law.45 This
expectation means, for example, that in instances where new entrants
are entitled to collocate (i.e., gain physical access) in an incumbent
telephone provider's central switching office to interconnect their
lines with the incumbent's (so the entrant's customers can call the
incumbent's customers), the state agency will be able to order the
incumbent provider to comply with the relevant requirements of the
Act and FCC regulations.46
Before the passage of the Telecom Act, state agencies that
sought to facilitate competition in local telephone markets often took
steps analogous to the types of arrangements contemplated by the
Telecom Act. In Oregon, for example, the state Public Utility
Commission (PUC) ordered the incumbent local telephone
companies to allow competitors to physically collocate in the
incumbents' central offices so that they could access the incumbents'
customers.47 In response to this requirement, GTE, a telephone
provider, challenged the authority of the Oregon PUC to mandate
"physical collocation" on the ground that the PUC lacked the
necessary eminent domain power to impose such a requirement.48
43. See infra Part III.A (discussing the anti-commandeering doctrine).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(1) (directing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to superintend arbitration of interconnection agreements if state agencies fail to do so).
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring incumbent providers to
permit the "collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection").
47. GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Or., 900 P.2d 495,498 (Or. 1995).
48. Id. at 506. Before the Telecom Act was passed, the FCC also lacked such
authority. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1447 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (invalidating
FCC rules requiring incumbent providers to allow physical collocation).
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Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the Oregon
PUC lacked such authority under its state charter and thus was not
able to order this step necessary to facilitating competition in the
local market (and in the market for "access" to long distance
customers). 
4 9
Under the Telecom Act, state agencies like the Oregon PUC
have mandated physical collocation and other measures that the
agencies would not otherwise be authorized to do under state law.50
Relying on federal law to justify action not authorized under state
law, although not a "commandeering" of state agency resources as
defined in United States v. New York,51 certainly implicates the
integrity of state sovereignty. Unlike the situation in New York,
however, the Telecom Act does not require states to take any
particular action against their will; nonetheless, state agencies must
ask whether they can take actions not contemplated by their state law
charters in implementing a cooperative federalism program.
Arguably, the federal government can assume that state agency
implementation of federal law suggests that the agency possesses
lawful authority to take the regulatory action at issue. But for state
agencies in the position of the Oregon PUC, or for reviewing federal
courts (or state courts, if the question of lawful authority is certified
to them), the validity of regulatory actions not heretofore
contemplated by state law presents a novel question.
B. Efforts To Justify State Agency Implementation of Federal Law
Given the Supreme Court's renewed attention to principles of
state sovereignty and the stakes involved in implementing
49. GTE Northwest, 900 P.2d at 506.
50. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1182
(D. Or. 1999) (upholding a physical collocation requirement though not addressing the
issue of whether the state agency lacked authority to impose such a requirement). More
generally, the question of the lawfulness of state agency action arises whenever state PUCs
rely on federal authority to regulate unregulated services or affiliates of local providers.
See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 947
& n.2, (8th Cir. 2000) (relying on federal, not state, authority to take enforcement action
not jusitified under state law); US WEST Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193
F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding regulation by Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission of unregulated and deregulated services); US WEST
Communications, Inc. v. Hix, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1132 (D. Colo. 2000) (upholding
regulation of an unregulated US WEST directory affiliate by a state agency under federal
authority); US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d
968, 984 (D. Minn. 1999) (considering whether federal law, in the absence of state law
authority, authorizes the regulation of an unregulated US WEST directory affiliate).
51. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). For a discussion of the commandeering doctrine, see infra
Part III.A.
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cooperative federalism programs like the Telecom Act, it is likely that
some disgruntled parties will challenge the role of state agencies in
implementing federal law.52 Although the classic commandeering
challenge is unlikely to succeed where a state voluntarily agrees to
implement a federal regulatory program,53 a voluntary assumption of
power not authorized by state law raises the novel question of
whether state agencies can justify their actions based on federal law.
To date, courts and commentators have offered three distinct theories
to justify state participation in federal regimes: (1) a "contract"
theory, (2) a "preemption" theory, and (3) a "presuming institutional
autonomy" theory. As discussed below, none of these theories
adequately justifies state agency implementation of federal law in
ways not contemplated by state law.
The use of federal contracts with state agencies does not
effectively justify state agency implementation of federal programs.
In certain cases, the authority of state agencies to contract with the
federal government may provide a sufficiently broad authorization to
engage in whatever regulatory actions are contemplated under the
Medicaid Act or other cooperative federalism regimes based on
federal-state agreements. Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court
recently relied on this theory, concluding that the Mississippi
Department of Health possessed the relevant authority to administer
a number of federally authorized regulatory actions on the ground
that it was authorized to enter into contracts with federal or state
entities where doing so was in the public interest.54 This justification,
however, applies in only the limited situations where a state agency
contracts with the federal government. Moreover, taken alone, this
theory might be unavailing where state law would otherwise not
authorize the agency to take the action contemplated by the federal
regulatory program.
The theory that the federal government's bestowal of authority
on a state entity constitutes a preemption of the state prohibition
takes the preemption doctrine too far by using it to authorize, as well
52. See Ara B. Gershengorn, Note, Private Party Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment
Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1094 (2000) (arguing that citizens
and companies can raise Tenth Amendment challenges).
53. Cf., e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 340-44 (7th Cir.
2000) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Telecom Act on the grounds that the
state commissions had waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity).
54. See Molden v. Miss. St. Dep't of Health, 730 So. 2d 29, 35 (Miss. 1998) ("[T]he
Department clearly has the authority to enter into contracts with a federal agency and




as limit, state regulation. The dispute in Washington Department of
Game v. Federal Power Commission,55 where the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) authorized the City of Tacoma to construct a dam
despite a state law barring such an action, provides an example of
how this theory would work. 6 In that case, the City avoided the
strictures of state law by arguing that a subsequent federal action
preempted the state law, even though the City was a creature of state
law. 7 After a procedural history that spanned ten years, the
Washington Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Congress's
establishment of the FPC "preempted the entire field" and displaced
any state limitations that would interfere with the terms or conditions
of licenses issued by the FPC.5 8 Echoing this conclusion, the United
States Supreme Court has at least twice concluded that state receipt
of a federal grant requires the state to comply with the conditions of
the grant, even where they conflict with state law. 9
The final strategy for justifying state agency implementation of
federal programs is Professor Roderick Hills's suggestion that state
agencies should be presumptively authorized to implement federal
law where state enabling legislation is otherwise ambiguous on the
topic.60 This approach equates preserving state participation in
national programs with preventing national intrusion into state
programs; consequently, it calls for the converse of the clear
statement rule set forth in Gregory v. Ashcroft.6' Under Gregory,
federal legislation is presumed not to limit state action unless
Congress declares clearly that states are subject to its constraints. 62 In
arguing for a "reverse-Gregory" regime, Professor Hills explained
that "[a]s with Gregory, the presumption of institutional autonomy
can be justified as a way to ensure that the political process-the state
political process-carefully considers an important constitutional
55. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953).
56. Id. at 396.
57. 1I The Washington Supreme Court viewed the matter differently than the Ninth
Circuit, see City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 262 P.2d 214, 228-29 (Wash. 1953),
but the United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court on the
ground that the Ninth Circuit's decision precluded it from reaching a contrary result. See
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320,340 (1958).
58. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 371 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Wash. 1962).
59. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
333-34 (1968).
60. Hills, Dissecting the State, supra note 5, at 1246.
61. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
62. d. at 463-64.
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value-effective national spending programs-before foreclosing
local participation in those programs."'63
Unfortunately, none of the three theories outlined above
explains why, in the Telecom Act example discussed previously, the
Oregon PUC can mandate physical collocation in GTE's central
offices despite its lack of eminent domain authority under its state
charter. The contract theory is of no help in the telecommunications
context because the state agencies do not contract with the federal
government.64 As for Professor Hills's presumption of institutional
authority theory, it would appear to be unavailing where a state
supreme court has authoritatively construed a state agency's enabling
legislation.65 That is, when a state supreme court has already
interpreted the relevant enabling statute (or it is unambiguous),
Professor Hills's reverse-Gregory interpretive principle does not
come into play. The preemption theory comes the closest, but upon
closer examination, it, too, is not quite up to the task.
Framing the question as preempting a state law bar to action is
both invasive of state authority and masks the real issue. To be sure,
the difference between overriding a bar to action and providing
authorization may be semantic at some level-a position suggested by
the Supreme Court's decision not to adopt one perspective or the
other in Howlett v. Rose.66 Unfortunately, this articulation fails to
appreciate that courts must evaluate the jurisdictional capability of
the state agency asked to implement federal law; this inquiry follows
63. Hills, Dissecting the State, supra note 5, at 1249.
64. More generally, the contract model, which arose out of federal funding programs,
does not translate to the exercise of regulatory authority.
65. As addressed below, a particular conception of Professor Hills's theory mirrors
the reverse-Erie model outlined herein. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
66. 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) ("[W]hether the question is framed in pre-emption terms
... or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a 'federal' cause of action ... the
Florida court's refusal to entertain one discrete category of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claims,
when the court entertains similar state-law actions against state defendants, violates the
Supremacy Clause."). Given the judicial fondness for employing the preemption
metaphor (even it does not aptly describe authorizing an agency to take action), that may
well be the term used to describe the application of the reverse-Erie model proposed in
this Article. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 n.12 (1997) (describing reverse-Erie
doctrine as calling for preemption of inadequate state rules as opposed to authorizing,
under federal law, the adequate rule); Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 3
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 231, 232-33 (1979) (stating that "the specificity of the preemption
provision contained in the EPAA, which clearly does not contemplate the type of
preemption involved here, coupled with the substantial constitutional question [of
intrusion on state sovereignty] that would be presented" suggests strongly that a state




from whether state agencies can utilize a federal authorization and is
sidestepped under the preemption approach.67
To most forthrightly and accurately capture the balance between
federal supremacy and state autonomy, this Article suggests that
courts employ a reverse-Erie model to determine under what
conditions a state agency can implement federal law that it would not
be authorized to implement under state law.6 Under this model,
state legislatures are always free to update their enabling legislation
to make clear that the agency cannot take the action in question.
Under the preemption approach, by contrast, the state legislature
loses all control to define the jurisdictional capability of the state
agency.69
C. The Reverse-Erie Model
Depending on the nature of the state agency's role in
implementing the particular cooperative federalism program, the
reverse-Erie model would apply either as a federal mandate under the
Supremacy Clause7° or as an interpretive guide for state agencies or
courts evaluating the scope of state regulatory authority to implement
federal regulatory programs. This Section first sets out the reverse-
Erie model, and then explains how it applies to state agency
implementation of federal law. In so doing, it outlines an approach
for putting cooperative federalism into practice and anticipates, as
developed in Part III, an appropriate conception of the role for a
Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine.
67. See James D. Barnett, The Delegation of Federal Jurisdiction to State Courts by
Congress, 43 AM. L. REv. 852, 853 (1909) [hereinafter Barnett, Federal Jurisdiction] ("It
would seem that [federal laws conferring state jurisdiction] may be logically justified only
as a recognition of inherent authority of the States or as a valid delegation of judicial
power.").
68. Of course, one could object to all delegations of federal power to state agencies,
but this would fly in the face of the longstanding reality to the contrary. See, e.g., James D.
Barnett, The Delegation of Legislative Power by Congress to the States, 2 AM. POL. SC.
REv. 347, 377 (1908) (concluding that the theory that federal authority could not be
delegated to the states "has been utterly ignored, with the result that relations between the
Union and the States, supposedly determined by the Constitution, have been altered by
the action of congress").
69. To be sure, state agencies can decline to implement cooperative federalism
programs under the Printz anti-commandeering rule, but this ability to decline the
implementation function is exercised by the state executive (as opposed to the legislature)
and may not allow for selective implementation. For a discussion of Printz, see infra notes
145-48 and accompanying text.
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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1. The Reverse-Erie Doctrine
Testa v. Katt7 set forth the foundation for the reverse-Erie
doctrine by concluding that the Supremacy Clause empowers, and
indeed requires, state courts to exercise jurisdiction in federal causes
of action.72  Although Testa stated this point most forcefully, the
federal courts had been building up to this conclusion for some time.7
3
In Testa, the Supreme Court held that state courts must enforce
federal law, provided that the federal claim is of the "same type" as
that enforced by the state court and that the state has no "valid
excuse" for declining jurisdiction.74 In particular, Testa held that
Rhode Island state courts could not decline jurisdiction to adjudicate
cases under the federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. 5 In so
doing, Testa, its predecessors, and its progeny make clear that "Our
Federalism"76 is a unified system, with its own jurisprudence that must
sensibly integrate two different jurisdictions."
At bottom, Testa federalizes the question of what types of claims
must be heard by state courts and, as explained in FERC v.
Mississippi,78 state administrative agencies.79  Testa's predecessors,
which involved state court adjudication of the Federal Employees
Liability Act (FELA),80 concluded that states were required to hear
71. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
72. Id at 394.
73. See, e.g., Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377,388 (1929) (noting
that "there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon [state]
Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse").
74. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-94.
75. Id. at 394.
76. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) ("It should never be forgotten that
this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States,
occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.").
77. An important precedent which Testa relied on and quoted from Mondou v. New
York N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912), made this very point:
The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws
is no reason why it should not afford relief [to a federal cause of action]; because
it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to
recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws.
The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of
the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to
each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same
country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.
Id. at 58 (quoted in Testa, 330 U.S. at 392); see also Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,222-23 (1916) (discussing Mondou).
78. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
79. Id. at 759-70.
80. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
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FELA cases by analogizing them to common law negligence actions.81
Testa and its progeny, however, required changes in state procedure
to accommodate federal rights,' 2 thereby markedly expanding the
"nondiscrimination model" that some courts and commentators had
adhered to before Testa.' In particular, Testa requires a state to
provide a "valid excuse" to justify its refusal to exercise federally
conferred jurisdiction.' Moreover, as some commentators have
noted, Testa's underlying rationale suggests a broad rule that states
should hear all federal claims, even if they do not provide jurisdiction
for analogous ones.8 In light of its potential breadth and lack of
definition, commentators have often criticized Testa as setting forth
an unpredictable doctrine that is insufficiently sensitive to state
interests.86
Regardless of where the reverse-Erie doctrine's mandate ends, it
clearly modifies the famous dictum, often attributed to Professor
Henry Hart, clarifying that "[f]ederal law takes state courts as it finds
them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not 'impose
unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws.' "I That is, where state courts lack authority to enforce an
81. Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 222-23; Mondou, 223 U.S. at 56.
82. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngtown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952)
(holding that the petitioner had a right to a jury even in the absence of state statutory
authorization).
83. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 291 (5th ed. 1994)
(terming "very doubtful" the non-discrimination perspective that federal law "must take
the state courts as it finds them").
84. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIs. L. REv. 39, 169-70 (emphasizing that Testa made it more difficult
for states to decline to adjudicate federally-created causes of action).
85. See Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 187, 205 ("If the duty of the state
courts to accept jurisdiction flows from the obligation to respect federal policy, there is no
apparent reason why the state should not be required to accept jurisdiction even though it
would not entertain an analogous forum-created right."); James D. Barnett, Comment,
Enforcement of Federal Laws by State Courts, 24 OR. L. REV. 148, 155 (1945) ("[T]he
Federal 'supremacy' doctrine would, logically, apply with equal force to state laws and
state constitutions that might be designed to limit or abolish the jurisdiction of the state
courts here considered.").
86. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts,
70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1774 (1992) (arguing that "on some occasions the Supreme Court
will reach down... and force federal procedure on state courts").
87. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988) (quoting Brown v. W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S.
294, 298 (1949)). In Felder, Justice Brennan explicitly analogized the duty of state courts
to adjust to the requirements of federal law to the Erie doctrine. See id. at 151 ("Just as
federal courts are constitutionally obligated to apply state law to state claims, so too the
Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty to proceed in such manner
that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law [are] protected."
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
important aspect of a federal right-say, providing a jury trial or
certain equitable remedies-reverse-Erie principles require that the
state court rely on federal authority to supplement its ordinary
practice.88 The Supreme Court set forth this principle most forcefully
in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngtown Railroad,9 which required a
state court to provide a jury for FELA cases because it was "part and
parcel of the substantive right," even if such a measure was not
authorized by state law.90 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter challenged
the conclusion that a state that did not discriminate against a federal
claim would have to take special measures-i.e., provide a jury where
it would not ordinarily do so-to enforce federal law.91 In so doing,
he built on his dissent in Brown v. Western Railway, where he
offered the dictum later echoed by Professor Hart-a FELA plaintiff
in state court must "take the jury system as he finds it"-and
underscored that state courts "are creatures of the States, with such
structures and functions as the States are free to devise and define." 9
3
In Brown, as Justice Frankfurter highlighted, the Supreme Court
crafted the reverse-Erie notion around the fiction that state court
adjudication of federal law merely relies on a state law jurisdictional
capacity.94 In part because it rests on this fiction, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that reverse-Erie would not justify creating a forum
out of whole cloth solely to accommodate a federal cause of action.
95
(internal quotations and citations omitted)); id ("[N]otions of federalism.., dictate that
the State's outcome-determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right
in state court.").
88. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (holding that in
the maritime law context, reverse-Erie requires that "substantive remedies afforded by the
States conform to governing federal maritime standards").
89. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
90. Id. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. R.R. Co., 319 U.S. 350,354 (1943)); see also
Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1024-26 (1995)
[hereinafter Caminker, State Sovereignty] (arguing that Congress has the ultimate
authority to dictate how state courts must enforce federal law).
91. Dice, 342 U.S. at 367 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
92. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
93. Id at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter had previously stated this
principle in concurrence. See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 190 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Despite the endurance of this dictum, it does not accurately describe the law.
See WRIGHT, supra note 83, at 291 (noting that federal law can compel some changes in
state judicial procedure).
94. See Barnett, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 67, at 860 (noting that the courts have
"overlooked" the purported limitation that state court authority cannot be increased by an
act of Congress).
95. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) ("The requirement that a state court of
competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include
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Similarly, as to state administrative agencies, reverse-Erie would not
justify state agency implementation of federal law where the state
statutory scheme explicitly and self-consciously sought to prevent the
agency from implementing the action contemplated by the federal
scheme.96 In such cases, the state would have a "valid excuse" for
declining jurisdiction to adjudicate the federal claims.97
Over the lifespan of the reverse-Erie doctrine, the Supreme
Court has left the contours of the "valid excuse" doctrine largely
undefined.98  Indeed, the Court's pre-Testa jurisprudence also
provides little guidance on the parameters of the "valid excuse"
concept, as it only vaguely required that states consent to administer
federal law and that the exercise of federal authority not be
incompatible with state duties.99 In particular, the Court has upheld
only three attempts to decline jurisdiction, all of which involved a rule
of administration that required the Court to dismiss the case.' °°
Consequently, the doctrine remains somewhat undefined and has
been able to coexist with the longstanding fiction that state courts
cannot rely on federal authorization to modify their usual practice,
despite the fact that the Court has required certain changes to
accommodate the demands of federal law.10 Because of this tension,
within it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which
the federal claim is presented.").
96. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982) ("[I]f a State has no utilities
commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal
proposals."); see also id. at 760 ("The Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction to entertain
claims analogous to those granted by PURPA, and it can satisfy Section 210's
requirements simply by opening its doors to claimants.").
97. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378 ("This case does not present the question whether
Congress can require the States to create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal
statutory rights... [that] would not otherwise be subject to the court's jurisdiction.").
98. Parmet, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that question has been "left open" by the Testa
doctrine); Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State
Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 99 (1998)
(observing that the Supreme Court has given "relatively little attention to this question").
99. See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1883) (addressing the issue by
referring to longstanding historical practice of state implementation of federal law).
100. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4 (1950) (upholding the dismissal of a FELA
claim through application of the forum non conveniens doctrine); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 123 (1945) (upholding the dismissal of a FELA claim on the ground that court
lacked territorial jurisdiction); Douglas v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387-
88 (1929) (upholding the dismissal of a FELA claim where the controlling statute required
dismissal of claims involving nonresident plaintiffs and defendants).
101. Compare Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367 (holding that state courts are charged with "a
coordinate responsibility to enforce [federal law] according to their regular modes of
procedure"), with Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 203-05 (1991) (holding
that regular state sovereign immunity cannot be 'applied where FELA authorizes a
plaintiff to bring a claim in state court).
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it is conceivable that the Court will cut back on the reverse-Erie
principle and institute the rule that the federal government must take
a state court (or administrative agency) as it finds it. To do so,
however, the Court would ignore the important stare decisis rationale
for maintaining a regime that the federal and state governments have
relied on in enacting cooperative federalism statutes like the Telecom
Act.102
2. Defining the Contours of State Regulatory Authority to
Implement Federal Law
In FERC v. Mississippi,' the Supreme Court evaluated a Tenth
Amendment challenge to PURPA's reliance on state public utility
commissions to resolve disputes between incumbent providers of
electric power and qualifying cogenerator and small power
producers.) 4 In particular, the Court addressed whether "federal
rights granted by PURPA can appropriately be enforced through
state adjudicatory machinery." 5 Highlighting that the functions
contemplated by PURPA were adjudicative in nature, the Court
concluded that the Supremacy Clause's mandate that state courts
adjudicate federal law justified the federal government's effort to
enlist state agencies in advancing federal public policy (unless they
had a "valid excuse" for not doing so).106 Thus, the Court suggested
that the scope of state agency authority to implement cooperative
federalism programs like PURPA-i.e., those requiring state agencies
to undertake adjudicative responsibilities-turned on the reverse-Erie
doctrine as set forth in Testa v. Katt and its progeny."W
102. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 203 (noting that stare decisis concerns weigh against a
fundamental change in doctrine that would impose serious restructuring costs and require
states to reexamine their statutes).
103. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
104. lIL at 759-60.
105. Id. at 761.
106. See iL at 760-62.
107. See id. In addition, the Court relied on its decision in Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979), where it
required a state agency to prepare rules that it was not authorized to do under state law.
FERC, 456 U.S. at 762. In Washington State Commercial Passenger, the Court accepted
the State of Washington's argument that its authority to issue certain regulations turned
on federal legal requirements, despite an earlier ruling that suggested that the Department
of Game lacked authority as a matter of state law. Wash. State Commercial Passenger, 443
U.S. at 672-73, 693-94. Thus, Washington State Commercial Passenger held that the
orders of a federal judge could authorize action by state officials that would not otherwise
be justified under state law. I&t at 695-96.
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FERC's reliance on the Supremacy Clause to mandate and
justify state agency implementation of federal law provoked two
vigorous dissents. In a partial dissent, Justice Powell objected to the
conclusion that federal law could "define the nature of' state
administrative agencies, quoting from Professor Hart's dictum that
"'[t]he general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of
state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them.' "108 Similarly, Justice O'Connor argued
both that PURPA "conscript[ed] state public utility commissions into
the national bureaucratic army" and that applying Testa to a
legislative context "vastly expands the scope of that decision."'1 9 As
these dissents foretold, the Supreme Court would continue to struggle
over the next two decades to develop a stable regime for federal-state
relations.
With respect to state agency implementation of federal
regulatory programs, it remains unclear whether FERC will supply
the appropriate guide on the legality of such action. As an initial
matter, not all such programs will impose purely adjudicative
responsibilities on state agencies, though the Telecom Act, for
example, can be closely analogized to PURPA.n0 More significantly,
the Supreme Court may well narrow-if not overrule-FERC by
defining "adjudicative" very narrowly in future such cases.'
As the Supreme Court appreciated in FERC, the future success
of cooperative federalism initiatives will depend in part upon judicial
acceptance of a default rule recognizing that state agencies enjoy
greater leeway in implementing federal law than in implementing
state law. In particular, such a default rule-animated by a judicial
commitment to facilitate cooperative federalism (i.e., a reverse-
Gregory perspective)-assumes that where a state legislature did not
anticipate the changed circumstances reflected in the federal
legislation, federal and state courts and agencies should not assume
that the state would wish to apply an otherwise applicable state bar to
action in the face of contrary federal law. At present, the courts
108. FERC, 456 U.S. at 774 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM L.
REV. 489,508 (1954)).
109. Id. at 775, 784 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
110. Under the Telecom Act, state public utility commissions, as under PURPA, act as
arbiters between incumbent providers and new entrants. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. IV
1998).
111. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997) (highlighting that the
adjudicative responsibilities alone justified the Court's decision in FERC).
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continue to uphold state regulatory actions based on federal authority
without attempting to justify this state of affairs."2 If states adopt the
reverse-Erie model to address this issue, however, state agencies and
courts will benefit from a doctrinal framework that demands a self-
conscious balancing between protecting state autonomy and
preserving the effectiveness of cooperative federalism programs.
In addition to the reverse-Gregory value of supporting a federal
initiative,"3 states should adopt the reverse-Erie approach because it
avoids putting determinative weight on whether a state agency acts in
an adjudicative or legislative context. In implementing cooperative
federalism schemes, state agencies will often face the choice of
developing federal rules in either an adjudicative or legislative
context.11 4 By not adopting a reverse-Erie approach for evaluating
the scope of state agency legislative and executive authority to
implement federal law, state courts (or federal courts anticipating
what state courts would do) would create an enormous incentive for
state agencies to act in an adjudicative context-so as to fall within
FERC-even where it might make more sense to proceed in a
legislative fashion.
In sum, courts should interpret state enabling legislation to allow
state agencies to implement the cooperative federalism statutes that
they choose to administer unless doing so requires a fundamental
change in form. By advancing this perspective, the reverse-Erie
approach contributes to the success of the federal regulatory
program, avoids creating an anomalous incentive for implementing
cooperative federalism programs through adjudication (as opposed to
legislative or executive action), and presumes that the state limitation
on agency action did not intend to prevent state agency
112. See supra note 50.
113. For a discussion of the reverse-Gregory principle, see supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.
114. This is the case in the Telecom Act context, for example, in which state agency
arbitration of interconnection agreements between entrants and incumbent providers can
rely in part on legislative proceedings (i.e., developing certain rules through notice and
comment), can be conducted entirely in an adjudicative fashion, or may combine aspects
of both arbitration and rulemaking. See AT&T Communications v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 932, 952 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (noting that arbitration incorporated
aspects of both adjudication and rulemaking); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267,294 (1974) (holding that agencies have discretion to choose between adjudication
and rulemaking); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776-77 (1968) (allowing
the Federal Power Commission to use ratemaking rather than adjudication to regulate
natural gas prices); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that the




implementation of federal law.1 5  To give effect to this approach,
state agencies might adopt one of two rationales: that the federal law
preempts the old state bar or that the limitation in the enabling
statute does not apply to bar the state agency implementation of
federal law." 6 Under either approach, the agency could avoid calling
its enabling statute "obsolete,"" 7 but at the same time alert its
legislature to the fact that it might wish to update its state law to
adapt to the new legal regime."1
8
3. Reverse-Erie: A Model for Cooperative Federalism
In the tradition of the Erie doctrine, the Supreme Court would
do well to look to its flexible concept of accommodation and interest
balancing to guide the valid excuse principle. Under Erie, "[flederal
courts have interpreted" federal procedural rules "with sensitivity to
important state interests and regulatory policies.""' 9 Thus, the
question for federal courts confronting a possible conflict between the
demands of state substantive law and federal procedural law is
whether they can "give effect to the substantive thrust" of state law
"without untoward alteration of the federal scheme."' 20  Similarly,
115. Cf Printz, 521 U.S. at 909-11 (explaining that a number of the Federalist Papers'
discussions about state involvement in federal regulatory schemes "appear to rest on the
natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the
Federal Government").
116. As discussed above, the preemption method suggests a more permanent state of
affairs than need be the case. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. That is,
under a reverse-Erie approach, a later state enactment would constitute a valid excuse; by
deeming the federal act preemptive, it would suggest that the later enactment would be
without effect. In addition, the use of preemption to supply legal authority where it did
not otherwise exist stretches the proper conception of that doctrine. See idL; see also
Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz
and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Cr. REV. 71, 95 (distinguishing between commandeering as a duty
requiring action and preemption as a duty not requiring action).
117. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982)
("The combination of lack of fit and lack of current legislative support I will call the
problem of legal obsolescence .... [To address the problem of legal obsolescence courts
might] create a situation in which conscious legislative reconsideration of the law was
made likely.").
118. One could also argue that the process of forcing state legislatures to revisit their
enabling legislation for their PUCs would not be a bad thing. While this is undoubtedly
true, the confusion and disruption to cooperative federalism statutory schemes that would
result from such a process would be considerable and quite costly.
119. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415,427 n.7 (1996).
120. Id at 426. The Supreme Court took a step in the direction of applying this
approach in the reverse-Erie context in Howlett, in which it explained that "[w]hen a state
court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of
the courts, we must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain
the claim." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,372 (1990).
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state agencies confronted with a reverse-Erie question need to ask
whether the adaptations necessary to apply federal law would require
an "untoward alteration" of state institutions in order to implement
the federal program.'
Under reverse-Erie principles, agencies and courts should not
view the lack of authority to implement certain measures under state
law as necessarily barring such activity under federal law.'2 Rather,
they should conclude that implementing federal law is compatible
with a state agency's charter, provided that the state agency does not
have to fundamentally change its form and that an enactment after
passage of the federal scheme could preclude the state agency from
taking the heretofore unauthorized action.'2 In so doing, courts
would harmonize the conflict between the tradition that federal law
must take state courts as it finds them and the one that proclaims that
federal law can justify alterations of state practice where necessary to
effectuate a federal right.124 In addition, such an approach would
121. This balancing approach appears to be what Justice O'Connor had in mind for the
now-abandoned National League of Cities regime that barred the federal government
from regulating actual state governmental functions. See generally Nat'l League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (protecting states from federal regulation of "essential
government functions"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 496
U.S. 528 (1985). In her dissent in Garcia, Justice O'Connor suggested that the appropriate
constitutional rule should "weigh[] state autonomy [interests] as a factor in the balance" of
whether a federal law impacting on state interests passes constitutional muster. Id. at 588
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (holding that state jurisdiction is
warranted where "it is not excluded by express provision, or by incompatibility in its
exercise arriving from the nature of the particular case"); cf. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310-12 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a state provision
addressing plaintiff settlement offers is compatible with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
68, which only explicitly contemplates offers by defendants).
123. See Caminker, State Sovereignty, supra note 90, at 1030 ("Congress's power to
conscript other branches does not entail the power to require fundamental restructuring of
the state's administrative machinery."). In AT&T Communications v. Pacific Bell, 203
F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2000), for example, the Ninth Circuit confronted this phenomenon in
addressing whether state agency procedural prequisites to judicial review needed to be
followed in the Telecom Act context. See id. at 1185-87. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
properly recognized that the policies of the federal Act weighed against giving effect to the
state rule requiring a filing of a petition for reconsideration, but its analysis more closely
resembled the preemption model than a reverse-Erie approach. ld. at 1185-87. In
particular, AT&T did not allow for the possibility that certain state procedural rules might
be fundamental to the functioning of a state agency, but it is possible that the Ninth
Circuit might approach the matter differently if the state agency was asked to act in a
manner that would require an "untoward alteration" of its form.
124. Compare Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,372 (1990) (stating that the "general rule,
'bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is
that federal law takes state courts as it finds them.'" (quoting Henry M. Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954))), with
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make clear that the Erie framework provides a guide that is "the very
essence of our federalism,"'1 reaffirm FERC's endorsement of
cooperative federalism, and disavow the suggestion that "Our
Federalism" is one built on separate federal and state spheres of
authority.
126
Even where the Supremacy Clause does not mandate a reverse-
Erie approach to ascertaining the scope of state regulatory authority
(i.e., for instances where the task is legislative or executive in nature),
state agencies and courts would do well to use reverse-Erie principles
to evaluate whether the agencies' state charters can tolerate taking
the actions that the federal regulatory program requires. States
would then recognize that the value of implementing the federal
scheme justifies the exercise of authority that might not be
permissible under state law. To be sure, there may well be instances
where the action at issue would be utterly inconsistent with the
mandate of the state agency, but in most situations the state charter
will simply have failed to contemplate what the agency would do in
such a situation. Thus, like Professor Hills's presumption of
institutional autonomy theory,' the reverse-Erie model outlined here
(at least where the state agency is not acting in an adjudicative
capacity) envisions that the states would adopt a default rule that
regards state agency implementation of federal law as a value to be
supported as long as it does not effect an untoward alteration of the
state agency's form and mandate.
On one view of Professor Hills's theory, it would fit quite nicely
with and even endorse the reverse-Erie model. Most fundamentally,
both theories recognize the importance of construing state law to
protect state autonomy and to embrace cooperative federalism.
2 8
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988) ("Federal law takes state courts as it finds them
only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not 'impose unnecessary burdens upon
rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.' "(quoting Brown v. W. Ry. Co. of Ala., 338
U.S. 294,298 (1949))).
125. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974).
126. See Redish & Sklaver, supra note 98, at 91 ("Ironically, much of the nation's
history of judicial federalism similarly supports rejection of any principle of mutual
exclusivity of sovereign power.").
127. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
128. Professor Hills captures the balance that both theories attempt to straddle:
On one hand, state lawmakers-including state constitutional draftspersons-are
best situated to develop institutions for local governance: they ought to have the
final word in creating such institutions. On the other hand, the federal
government often needs to use such institutions: presuming that such institutions
maintain their independence and can compete with each other to act as agents of
Congress helps protect the federal government's access to these institutions.
Hills, Dissecting the State, supra note 5, at 1285.
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The reverse-Erie model, however, envisions a slightly stronger default
rule, providing that a state agency can implement federal law, at least
provisionally, when it opts to do so-even if the relevant enabling
legislation could not be interpreted to authorize the action at issue
under state law.29 Moreover, by supplying a more developed
analytical framework, the reverse-Erie model provides a clearer guide
to state courts and agencies than Professor Hills's proposed approach.
Finally, the reverse-Erie model acknowledges the intrusion on
state autonomy by authorizing state agencies to act in ways not
permitted in the state law context 30 but resolves this issue by
incorporating Testa's conception of the "valid excuse" as the
appropriate analytical tool for defining when state agencies cannot
implement federal law. In so doing, it recognizes that the "valid
excuse" limitation represents the intersection between the reverse-
Erie principle and the anti-commandeering rule. 3 ' By permitting
states to decline jurisdiction under certain circumstances, the valid
excuse doctrine avoids a direct conflict with instances where certain
demands of the reverse-Erie principle would intrude on "an attribute
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. 13 2
D. A Formal Response to a Lack of State Authority
In the event that a state rejects the application of the reverse-
Erie principle in this context or has a "valid excuse" for declining
certain of the mandates set out in a cooperative federalism statute,
129. If the reverse-Erie model construes the lack of authority to take a particular action
as inapplicable to the ability to take such action to implement federal law, and the
presuming institutional autonomy approach could be used in such a manner, then the two
approaches would run together. Professor Hills does not suggest that the reverse-Gregory
principle could be used in this manner, but it is conceivable that such a canon could view
the ability of states to implement federal, as opposed to state, law as a latent ambiguity
and thus within its scope.
130. In a Justice Department legal opinion, the Department explained that the ability
to rely on federal law, particularly in situations not envisioned explicitly by Congress,
could infringe on state sovereignty: "[lIt is difficult to conceive of a more significant
infringement on State authority than to conscript the Governor of a State, even a willing
Governor, into Federal service in contravention of State law reserving the services of the
Governor to the people of his State." Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 3
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 231,233 n.3 (1979).
131. Thus, what constitutes a "valid excuse" for not relying on a federal authorization
and what would constitute a commandeering of state judicial or administrative resources
should be identical, though approached from opposite directions (i.e., a lack of authority
versus an unconstitutional direction to a state body). See Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State
Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REV.
1465, 1496 ("A state has a valid excuse to refuse to hear a federal claim only when the
mandatory exercise of jurisdiction would constitute commandeering.").
132. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,156 (1992).
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state agency involvement may still be justified as "preliminary" to
federal enforcement of the statutory mandates. If, for example, a
state PUC could not enforce the right of an entrant into the local
telephone market to physically collocate in an incumbent provider's
central office, the state agency could simply establish the basic
framework for this right (i.e., the price necessary to compensate the
incumbent and other relevant terms and conditions) and allow the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to enforce this right. In
so doing, the state agency would merely take a "preliminary" action
that would not constitute the exercise of the sovereign eminent
domain authority that the state government had denied to it. Indeed,
in United States v. Jones,"' the Court used this theory to uphold a
statutory scheme that appeared to require state authorities to stand in
the shoes of the federal government in an eminent domain
proceeding. In particular, the Court concluded that the calculation of
"just compensation" did not constitute a delegation of eminent
domain power because such an action "is merely an inquisition to
establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the actual taking."
34
This formal end run around the state authority issue would only
be a second-best strategy because it entails a couple of notable
limitations. As an initial matter, this justification for state agency
involvement would sacrifice candor by relying on the questionable
fiction that all state action was preliminary to the exercise of federal
authority. More significantly, this approach would limit the ability of
states to implement federal law, thus leaving states unable to enforce
the federal regime and possibly discouraging states from participating
at all in the federal program. In so doing, this approach would
complicate matters for the regulated parties and would sacrifice some
of the benefits from a cooperative federalism. Nonetheless, as an
alternative to abandoning a cooperative federalism strategy
altogether, this strategy may be necessary and/or appropriate in
certain instances.
III. TOWARDS A TRULY COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE FUTURE
OF THE COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
Although the rhetoric of some recent Supreme Court opinions
addressing Tenth Amendment issues appears to endorse a model of
dual federalism-two separate and distinct spheres of authority-the
reality of cooperative federalism programs belies such a clean
133. 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
134. Idt at 519.
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separation. 135 As Professor Hart explained regarding the gap between
the rhetoric of separation and the reality of integration, it is a "little
noticed fact of our political history how often issues which might have
been resolved in favor of nation-wide uniformity have been resolved
instead in favor of decentralization."' 36
Appreciating the integrated relationship between federal and
state law, the reverse-Erie doctrine justifies state agency action to
implement federal law and provides important insights into the role
of state agencies in implementing cooperative federalism statutes.
While federal courts have sometimes concluded, without any
justification, that state agencies can take steps to implement
cooperative federalism statutes like the Telecom Act that they could
not otherwise take under state law, 37 the reverse-Erie model provides
a constitutional doctrine to support this instinct and delineate its
limits. More significantly, such an approach anticipates and provides
guidance for an emerging constitutional law of federalism that could
reinforce and support the political consensus in favor of cooperative
federalism. This Part develops that guidance and offers a theoretical
framework for the commandeering doctrine which sustains the
legitimacy of a cooperative federalism approach to regulation.
A. The State of Tenth Amendment Doctrine
It has become a truism to state that Tenth Amendment doctrine
is in flux. 3 8 In particular, the Supreme Court's decisions have largely
135. See Jane Perry Clark, Joint Activity Between Federal and State Officials, 51 POL.
SCI. Q. 230, 230 (1936) ("Complete independence of the federal and state governments
was neither contemplated by the [Founders] nor carried out in actual administrative
practice by their successors.").
136. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489,528 (1954); see id. at 498 ("[L]egal problems repeatedly fail to come wrapped up
in neat packages marked 'all federal' or 'all state.' ").
137. See, e.g., US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 55 F.
Supp. 2d. 968, 984 (D. Minn. 1999) (considering whether federal law could justify
regulation of an entity not subject to PUC oversight under state law); US WEST
Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., No. C97-222WD, 1998 WL 350588, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 1998) (concluding that the Washington PUC could regulate services
under federal law that it is not authorized to regulate under state law).
138. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 116, at 71 ("The area lacks a fabric of
constitutional law sufficiently coherent and well-justified to last."); Mark C. Gordon,
Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in
Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 187, 195 (1996) (observing that Tenth
Amendment doctrine has been "anything but stable"); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe,
The Eleventh Amendment and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 495, 542-43 (1997) (arguing that the Court's federalism jurisprudence has no
"substantive core" and "seems at present to be motivated by ill defined intuitions that the
Court must fix some sort of balance of power between the states and national
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failed to "address the problem of the underlying federal/state
relationship," 13 9 thereby leaving Congress to speculate whether its
vision of cooperative federalism is compatible with the Court's
emerging doctrine. The current state of judicial doctrine prohibits the
federal government from "commandeering" state legislative and
executive officers to implement a federal regulatory program, but its
lack of definition raises more questions than it answers. Part of the
present confusion is that the Court's opinions on the subject reflect, at
best, an inchoate vision of state autonomy.140 More troublingly, the
Court's opinions often rely on "abstract notions of dual sovereignty
and political accountability to support its doctrine that the national
government cannot commandeer the regulatory processes of the state
and local governments.'
' 4'
In justifying its "commandeering" doctrine, New York v. United
States42 focused on the need to protect political accountability.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor offered the following
explanation for the Court's concern about political accountability:
Where the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officers who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the
electoral ramifications of their decisions. Accountability is
thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the
government"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but
Missing the Beat. Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REv. 11, 14 (1998)
("At least arguably, the Supreme Court has largely failed to articulate a coherent theory
of federalism that explains the discrete results reached in particular cases and that would
facilitate reasonably accurate predictions regarding the probable results of future cases.");
Yoo, supra note 2, at 28 (arguing that the Court "has provided little guidance concerning
where the line between the two spheres of government ought to rest .... This evolution
[in the Court's federalism jurisprudence] will be halting, perhaps even unsuccessful,
without a broader theory to guide the judiciary as it meets each new case").
Unfortunately, the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence still fits the description that
Lewis Kaden offered over twenty years ago: "The Court's renewed sensitivity to state
interests is an encouraging development, although its struggle to articulate a doctrine that
allows a more meaningful consideration of state sovereignty when federal regulations are
challenged has not yielded satisfactory results." Lewis Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. RBv. 847,889 (1979).
139. Gordon, supra note 138, at 200.
140. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,714-15 (1999).
141. Roderick M. Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense cnd "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 817
(1998) [hereinafter Hills, Cooperative Federalism].
142. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal
regulation.143
In short, Justice O'Connor condemned the commandeering of
state governments on the ground that this practice would enable the
federal government to take credit for enacting popular statutes
without having to pay for them or make difficult implementation
decisions.' 4
In Printz v. United States,'45 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
focused more on the "structural framework of dual sovereignty" than
on the political economy of commandeering."4 In so doing, he
suggested a possible return to a vision of dual federalism and the
possible invalidation of cooperative federalism regulatory schemes,
even if achieved through the carrots of conditional spending or the
sticks of threatened preemption. 47 Justice O'Connor, however,
signaled that she would not go along with such an approach,
concurring in Printz to make clear that she would uphold cooperative
federalism programs." In so doing, Justice O'Connor identified a
sound theoretical basis for a constitutional law of federalism that
would not protect dual federalism as an end in and of itself, but
instead would ensure a truly cooperative federalism.
By tolerating federal efforts to encourage state participation in
federal programs, Justice O'Connor's vision of judicial federalism
would appear not to turn on promoting political accountability or
dual federalism as such, as that encouragement would undermine
clear lines of accountability. Rather, Justice O'Connor's approach
would protect the ability of states to exit from a federal scheme. 4 9
Thus, Justice O'Connor's vision of the commandeering doctrine
143. Id. at 169.
144. This concern mirrors the accountability argument advanced by David Schoenbrod
in relation to legislative delegations of authority to federal agencies. See DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WrrHOOT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION passim (1993).
145. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
146. Id. at 932.
147. Id It is possible that "dual sovereignty" is compatible with cooperative federalism
and is not identical to dual federalism. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 179
F.3d 29, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("A system of dual sovereignties cannot work without
informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction of a voluntary nature between sovereign
systems for the mutual benefit of each system.").
148. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (0 Connor, J., concurring); see also New York, 505 U.S. at
166 ("Our cases have identified a variety of methods ... by which Congress may urge a
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.").
149. As discussed below, preserving an exit right is critical to fostering a healthy
political economy of federalism. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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focuses more on allowing states to control their own destinies than on
promoting the electorate's understanding of the respective state and
federal roles, as the "erosion of political accountability is endemic to
all forms of cooperative federalism." 150
B. Towards a Forthright Approach to Constitutional Federalism
Nine years after New York, the Supreme Court continues to
search for a guiding framework for its Tenth Amendment doctrine.15'
Printz discussed at length the history of federal-state relations to
justify its decision, but this focus does more to legitimate a judicially
developed rule than to help define an emerging jurisprudence. 5 2
150. Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 828 (emphasis in original); see
also Printz, 521 U.S. at 957 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It doubtless may therefore
require some sophistication to discern under which authority an executive official is acting,
just as it may not always be immediately obvious what legal source of authority underlies a
judicial decision."). More fundamentally, our system of government, in which ambition
counteracts ambition, inherently sacrifices accountability concerns to serve other ends. As
Professor Greene aptly explained:
By dividing powers and insisting upon a complex system of checks-
bicameralism, presentment, and judicial review (not to mention federalism)-the
framers ensured against [the hegemony of a particular branch or person], but
simultaneously sacrificed accountability. It is pretty hard for citizens to know
precisely whom to blame when something goes wrong in such a system.
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CI.
L. REV. 123, 177 (1994). Some commentators have suggested that this concern is
misplaced because local politicians have the opportunity and incentive to correct any
public misperception of whom to blame for various laws. See Caminker, State Sovereignty,
supra note 90, at 1063.
151. Some commentators have criticized Justice Scalia for dressing up a rule made out
of whole cloth in historical and formalist garb. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 199, 234-35 [hereinafter
Caminker, Limits of Formalism]. As Professor Larry Kramer has explained, neither
constitutional text nor history can justify an anti-commandeering rule. See Kramer,
Political Safeguards, supra note 5, at 290 ("Active judicial intervention to protect the
states from Congress is consistent with neither the original understanding nor with more
than two centuries of practice."); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1485,1503 (1995) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism] ("[T]he test for
federalism today can't turn on which approach looks more like the original scheme in
some crude, surface-like manner. It must be: Which approach does a better job finding
the appropriate balance between state and federal authority in today's world?"); cf.
GREVE, supra note 28, at 54 (rejecting the historical and precedential basis for Printz).
Finally, some commentators have rejected the historical basis for an anti-commandeering
rule, but have concluded that one can be justified on prudential grounds. See H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 635 (1993)
(admitting that the anti-commandeering rule is "without a firm basis in founding-era
discussion or the subsequent history of constitutional debate. Nevertheless, I argue ...
that O'Connor's conception of federalism, or something like it, can be justified on
prudential grounds").
152. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism's Text, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1218, 1234 (1998) (arguing that Printz's result was not dictated by formalist
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court must define the terms upon which the
federal government and state governments can work together.
Printz, unlike Justice O'Connor's approach in New York, declined to
focus on functional justifications for protecting state governments
from federal "commandeering" and thus provided little guidance on
the Court's future direction in this area.'53 In short, by eschewing a
focus on practical governance, Printz further unsettled this area of the
law and forfeited an opportunity to justify better its result as well as
to provide guidance for future cases implicating alleged federal
intrusions on state sovereignty.' 4
The Supreme Court's most recent Tenth Amendment case, Reno
v. Condon, 55 suggests that an interest in practical governance may
well prevail over a rhetorical commitment to dual federalism. In
Reno, the Court rejected South Carolina's commandeering challenge
to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)56 on the ground that
the DPPA "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens."'57 Thus, although Reno did not directly
implicate an effort to involve the states in a federal regulatory
program, it did not embrace Printz's dual federalism rhetoric.
Further, it suggested that the Supreme Court will not invalidate a
federal regulatory program merely because it will consume a state's
time and resources.
In the future, as state courts and possibly the Supreme Court
address the right of the federal government to authorize state
regulatory action not contemplated by state law, they will squarely
confront some of the underpinnings of cooperative federalism.
Moreover, because cooperative federalism relies on Testa v. Katt, the
reverse-Erie doctrine, and FERC v. Mississippi, it will be far more
reasoning, but rather such reasoning was used to legitimate its "made up" anti-
commandeering rule); see also Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 496 (1987) ("For the Court, an important
advantage of formalism is its seemingly greater legitimacy. The Court can present a
decision as the natural outcome of applying the Constitution to a present day problem.").
Commentators have long remarked how the Court often invoked history in less than
genuine ways to justify or garner support for its opinions. See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. Cr. REV. 119 passim (outlining various
judicial misuses of history).
153. As a result, the majority opinion refused to even engage Justice Breyer on his
discussion of the experience of the European Union in developing the appropriate scope
of the anti-commandeering rule. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11.
154. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 28.
155. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
156. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
157. Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.
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difficult to dismiss on historical grounds a state agency's reliance on
federal law to take steps not specifically contemplated by state law.
To be sure, courts could decide that this line of precedent was
illegitimate and a deviation from the Framers' intent. Before doing
so, however, courts would likely consider the functional implications
of uprooting a doctrine that has been in place for over a half of a
century.5  Finally, any effort to overrule the Testa line of cases
(including FERC) will need to grapple with how such a move would
undermine important cooperative federalism regulatory schemes like
the Telecom Act-with the net result being that the federal
government would likely need to step up its efforts and establish a
greater number of local field offices to administer federal law. Thus,
in an irony not lost on many commentators, a constitutionalization of
dual federalism might well have the unintended consequence of
prodding Congress towards a preemptive federalism. 5 9
Assuming that the Court engages in an honest and open debate
over the future of "Our Federalism," it may well focus on federalism
as a means to more effective governance rather than as elevating state
sovereignty to an end in and of itself. As authorities from James
Madison to John Marshall to Woodrow Wilson have suggested, the
appropriate constitutional status of federalism is likely to be
contested again and again as each generation searches for how to use
this American innovation to improve government administration. 60
158. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLuM.
L. REV. 723, 724 (1988) ("[Qlriginal understanding must give way in the face of
transformative or longstanding precedent, a conclusion that in turn may make inevitable
the unsettling acknowledgment that originalism and stare decisis themselves are but two
among several means of maintaining political stability and continuity in society.").
159. See Caminker, State Sovereignty, supra note 90, at 1002-03 (explaining that
cooperative federalism can, in certain situations, preserve "a significant role for state
discretion in achieving specified federal goals, where the alternative is complete federal
preemption of any state regulatory role"); Roderick M. Hills, Federalism in Constitutional
Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 195 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, Constitutional
Context] (arguing that if the Supreme Court ultimately raises the difficulty of involving the
states in cooperative federalism statutes, "state autonomy would then truly become an
empty boon to the states, for they would have autonomy to do precisely nothing, as the
Congress federalized more regulatory fields without giving them any role to play"); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983)
("If the federal government begins to take full responsibility for social welfare spending
and preempts the states, the result is likely to be weaker and hence less combative state
governments."). Anticipating such a development, Justice Breyer criticized Printz by
asking, "Why, or how, would what the majority sees as a constitutional alternative-the
creation of a new federal gun-law bureaucracy, or the expansion of an existing federal
bureaucracy-better promote either state sovereignty or individual liberty?" 521 U.S. at
977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. See IRVING BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: A LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 146
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By recognizing the enduring nature of this debate, the Supreme Court
would enhance its legitimacy by acknowledging that the future of our
federalism should be open to debate about what will provide for
effective governance and not decided on the basis of a historical
record that is ambiguous at best.61 In so doing, the Court would own
up to the basic value choices inherent in constructing a constitutional
law of federalism.162 Moreover, by developing a doctrine rooted in
the important values of federalism, the Court would provide helpful
guidance to lower courts bewildered by the Court's current approach
and would set forth a doctrine that could steady the Court's path in
this important area of constitutional law.
C. A Constitutional Law for Cooperative Federalism
Without a clear guiding framework for the constitutional law of
federalism, it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court will
ultimately promote a doctrine that facilitates a truly cooperative
federalism. If the Court does so, it would do well to follow those
commentators calling for a constitutional doctrine that treats
federalism as a flexible principle that appreciates the importance of
the states as laboratories as well as partners with the federal
government in regulating interstate commerce. 163 Significantly, such a
(1970) (quoting a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph that remarked "[liet it
be tried ... whether any middle ground can be taken, which will at once support a due
supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far as they
can be subordinately useful"); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 35-36 (1996) (quoting James Madison as
saying, "'In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of
the changes which ages will produce' "); id. at 50-51 ("Madison realized that the deeper
problems of federalism would not disappear even after the Union acquired an
independent power of legislation. The respective jurisdictions of national and state
government could never be neatly distinguished; to some extent the boundary between
them must always remain problematic."); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding ... intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to adapted to the various crises of human affairs."); Woodrow Wilson, The
States and the Federal Government, 187 N. AM. REV. 684, 684 (1908) (arguing that the
question of federal-state relations "cannot, indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one
generation, because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political
and economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new question").
161. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 37 (1996) (recommending that "judges ... construct franker arguments of
principle that allow the public to join in the argument").
162. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SuP. Cr.
REV. 439, 477 (calling on the Court to cast aside the "tropes of twentieth-century judicial
rhetoric-originalism, tradition, precedent, and doctrinal manipulation-[that] serve to
legitimate the Court's power by minimizing the appearance of independent judgment").
163. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword. The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV.
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regime would recognize that "there must be a limit to federal power
and a corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have
any meaning at all."' In so doing, the Court would avoid two
extremes, both of which bode poorly for the role of states in the
federal scheme: a situation where the federal government must
nationalize an area in order to be an effective regulator or one where
the states are merely "branch offices" of the federal government.65
In a world where commerce is increasingly becoming international,
thereby providing another important rationale for federal legislative
involvement, it is critical that the Court develop a law of federalism
that provides a sustainable role for the states.166
Despite some of its recent rhetoric championing a dual
federalism perspective, the Supreme Court may well still chart a
constitutional doctrine that protects and facilitates cooperative
federalism. In particular, the Court's decision in Reno suggests that it
will not invalidate a federal regulatory regime simply because it
inconveniences a state.167 As Professor Hills has explained, an
appropriate anti-commandeering rule can respect states by
supporting the cooperative federalism model that the national
government "purchase" rather than "conscript" the cooperation of
state agencies.6 The Court's recent decisions, however, have yet to
L. REV. 4, 9 (1998) (suggesting that federalism should be treated "as a flexible principle
that allows decentralized experimentation, rather than as a doctrine focused primarily on
the 'dignity' of states"); id. at 61 ("[T]he Court's federalism doctrines implement the
notion of states as experimental laboratories imperfectly at best."); Gordon, supra note
138, at 195 (calling for a doctrine that moves away from a focus on "inviolate attributes of
state sovereignty" to one that "evaluat[es] the extent to which the underlying goals of
federalism may be furthered by the Court's holdings").
164. Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 816.
165. This approach would echo the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence that
protects the individual branches at times when one branch aggrandizes power over the
other, but recognizes that cooperation and sharing of power between them is par for the
course. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (recognizing that the Framers were
"practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who.., saw that a hermetic sealing off of the
three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively").
166. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 4 (1995)
("[F]ederal systems are not generally sustainable if they depend solely on the discretion of
the highest political authority, because that delegation of power can always be reversed.").
With respect to the development of cooperative federalism statutes, a sustainable role can
involve either the preservation of state law, the delegation to implement federal mandates
without federal executive oversight, and/or the allowance of such oversight on the
understanding that the states will be left with meaningful interpretive discretion.
167. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,150-51 (2000).
168. Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 817.
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endorse such a vision of cooperative federalism, thus creating the
possibility that the anti-commandeering doctrine may well undermine
innovative forms of federal-state cooperation in the name of state
sovereignty. Indeed, in light of the Court's recent pronouncements
on the subject, there is understandable cause for concern that some
Justices may well support a "nondelegation doctrine" that demands
that the states act only as independent sovereigns.
By concurring specially in Printz, Justice O'Connor signaled that
she may set out on her own path in crafting a constitutional law of
federalism.16 9  In particular, Justice O'Connor explained that
cooperative federalism programs could continue in the wake of
Printz, provided that state regulatory authorities "voluntarily
continue to participate in the federal program.' °70 In so doing, she
responded to the dissent's halting criticism that the Court's holding
could actually undermine federalism values by forcing the national
government to create a federal bureaucracy redundant to existing
state agencies in order to implement federal law.'7 ' Moreover, Justice
O'Connor responded to Justice Souter's argument that the Court's
holding threatened to undermine Federalist 27's vision of
incorporating the states into the "operations of the national
government" and rendering them as "auxiliary to the enforcement"
of federal law by explaining that such a partnership should be by
invitation, not by mandate. 72 Finally, Justice O'Connor suggested
169. In highlighting the important role played by Justice O'Connor on these matters, I
join Professor Powell in encouraging her to develop her "vision" of the judicial role in
constitutional federalism-a role that I believe points to a doctrine to support a truly
cooperative federalism. See Powell, supra note 151, at 689 ("Justice O'Connor has not
provided a fully persuasive justification for her vision of federalism, but by the same token
she has reopened the discussion along lines that seem promising.").
170. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added); see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,783 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is nothing 'cooperative' about a federal
program that compels state agencies either to function as bureaucratic puppets of the
Federal Government or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to
state authority.").
171. Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence suggested that both the use of conditional funding and conditional
preemption were legitimate means for the federal government to use to enlist state
participation in a cooperative federalism regulatory program. See id- at 936; see also Hills,
Constitutional Context, supra note 159, at 184 (noting that non-federal governments can
become the agencies of Congress either under federal grants-in-aid programs or by
allowing state or local regimes "to displace federal regulation that would otherwise
preempt such non-federal law if the non-federal law meets the standards established by
Congress").
172. Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 27,
at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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that her vision of federalism appreciates the value of a federal-state
partnership that is truly cooperative (i.e., where loyalty is earned, not
required) and would not elevate the form of state sovereignty over
the substance of state participation in a cooperative federalism
statutory scheme. 73
The truly cooperative federalist vision that Justice O'Connor
appears ready to endorse suggests the value of an anti-
commandeering principle that will facilitate an important political
economy of federalism. In particular, such a regime would safeguard
state resources from federal conscription (though not from being
purchased). In her FERC dissent, Justice O'Connor made this very
point, explaining that a federal regulatory scheme that enlisted state
participation would absorb state resources, precluding states from
"devot[ing] their resources elsewhere." 174 Indeed, forcing states to
spend money to implement a federal regulatory program can distort
the ability of a state to make its own fiscal decisions.7 5 Thus,
instituting a safeguard that protects the states' ability to say no to the
federal government and to control their own fisc will "preserve their
ability to negotiate with the federal government over the terms of
federal-state programs."' 6
173. Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Numerous commentators have
explained how respecting state participation in various federal regimes best serves
federalism concerns. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Federalism and Health Care Reform: Is
Half a Loaf Really Worse Than None?, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 614 (1994) ("A
national health care reform that combines federal and state roles would be of more benefit
to the states as institutions and to the values that underlie federalism than would a purely
federal program.").
174. FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
175. Printz elaborated on this point, explaining that:
[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving"
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the
costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of
taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.
521 U.S. at 930 (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1580 n.65 (1994)).
176. Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1571 (1994). Some anecdotal evidence, at least, suggests
that states will refuse conditional aid when it is insufficient to pay for a program or buy its
loyalty. See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 862-63. Without an exit
right, however, a state may not be given that option.
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D. Towards a Central Constitutional Principle of Preserving an Exit
Right for States
To promote a truly cooperative federalism, the anti-
commandeering principle should focus on providing the states with an
"exit right" from a federal regulatory program. In so doing, the anti-
commandeering rule would reinforce the ability of the states to be
heard in Washington. As Albert 0. Hirschman so insightfully
identified, the likelihood of voice relates to the ease of exit and the
efficacy of one's voice in affecting change is enhanced by a credible
threat to exit.177 Like the Tiebout hypothesis regarding competition
between local governments, Hirschman's framework has often been
applied to the horizontal relationship between localities or statesY.
8
It has not, however, been employed to highlight the dynamics of the
vertical federal-state relationship in cooperative federalism regulatory
programs. 179
In developing a judicially enforced federalism doctrine, the
Court performs a similar function to the one it plays in separation of
powers cases. 80 Consequently, it is critical that the Court develop an
analytical framework that is both justifiable and reflects the current
consensus in favor of cooperative federalism. The exit, voice, and
loyalty model provides an important guide in this regard, as it
highlights how commandeering removes exit as an option without
necessarily improving the voice of state government, thus raising the
chances of a "coercive federalism."
The essential rationale for not forcing states to participate in a
federal scheme is to ensure that the federal government does not
treat the "states purely as instruments of its national will," but rather
"as partners in policy formulation and implementation.' 18' While
177. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 7, at 36-43.
178. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 509-43 (1991). As
Professor Been explained, Professor Tiebout hypothesized that the ability of citizens to
move between states and localities would lead to a competition between states and
localities to provide the optimal mix of services and tax policies. Id. at 507 (discussing
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956)).
179. Professor Clayton Gillette has, however, outlined how this model applies to the
city-state relationship. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized
Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1410-11 (1997) (comparing the right of secession to an
exit right).
180. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 778-80
(1999) (comparing federalism and separation of powers jurisprudence).
181. Doff & Sabel, supra note 5, at 428; id. at 430 ("Our anticommandeering principle
requires only that when the federal government does find it attractive to enlist the states
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some have argued that the voice of state governments will invariably
be heard in Washington, 182 Hirschman's model underscores why the
ability to exit provides an important check on the failure of one party
to heed another's concerns. In particular, Hirschman explains that
the opportunity to exit ensures that members will be listened to,
whereas individuals with no credible ability to exit can be taken for
granted without fear of losing themY83 To be sure, the states
generally will not want to exit and the federal government will not
want to assume the responsibility of implementing the regulatory
scheme, but the threat of exit can help ensure that state officials will
be listened to in Washington.
The exit, voice, and loyalty model also underscores why it is
important to recognize and reaffirm that the federal government's
threat to take on the regulatory task itself (through conditional
preemption) as well as its willingness to "bribe" the states into
implementing federal regulation (through conditional spending) are
important ways that the federal government can encourage state
loyalty to a federal program by enabling the states to choose whether
or not to participate in that program." 4 Unlike commandeering,
conditional preemption and conditional spending regimes require the
federal government to "internalize" the costs of administering a
federal regulatory program." As a result, those regimes encourage
the federal government to listen to the voice of the states in designing
cooperative federalism programs. 86
directly in its regulatory programs, it does so by offering them the possibility of true
cooperation.").
182. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 151, at 1503-59.
183. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 7, at 36-43.
184. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "[w]hen the States know that the Union can
supply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part."
THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding welfare
reform law in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge on the ground that "Kansas'
options have been increased, not constrained, by the offer of more federal dollars"); cf.
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
an Eleventh Amendment challenge to the Telecom Act on the ground that "Congress
threatened the state with the denial of a gratuity rather than exclusion from an otherwise
lawful activity").
185. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 5, at 426 ("[B]oth conditional spending and
conditional preemption are effective tools only to the extent that the federal government
puts its money where its mandate is.").
186. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and Other
Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 289, 312-13 (1984) ("If
the federal government is willing to assume the full burdens of direct regulation it will not
impose regulations without carefully considering the costs involved."). Put in the
alternative, where the federal government does not have to contemplate the possible
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Even assuming that such an exit right is important to the success
of cooperative federalism, some have questioned whether the
judiciary could competently enforce a state's right to exit from a
cooperative federalism regulatory program.187 If the judiciary is
unsuccessful in enforcing such a conception of the anti-
commandeering regime, however, it will ultimately abandon the
effort, as the pressures of litigation and experience will lead it to
retire this rule. 8 Thus, given the value of such a rule, the federal
judiciary should endeavor to develop an analytically and functionally
viable constitutional law of federalism.
By adopting a clear underlying theoretical framework for its
Tenth Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court would provide a
valuable guide for lower courts addressing federalism issues. For
example, under the exit, voice, and loyalty model, state agencies
would be able to opt-out of a cooperative federalism regime like the
Telecom Act at any point in time unless Congress made it
unmistakably clear at the outset that taking on the Act's
responsibilities waived a state's ability to later exercise its anti-
commandeering rights.'89 In essence, the federal government could
condition state involvement in a regulatory regime if it made clear at
the outset that the states were "locked-in" to implementing a federal
program once they initially agreed to do so.190
implementation of federal programs because they mandate, or commandeer, state agency
implementation of them, it is far easier for the federal government to go ahead and
approve such efforts without much consideration.
187. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 151, at 1503.
188. Lessig, supra note 152, at 1235. Justice Cardozo similarly made this point,
suggesting that:
[t]he work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral.
What is good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good
remains the foundation on which new structures will be built. The bad will be
rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921); cf
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & St. Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 893 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, CJ., concurring) (considering whether the judicial protection of federalism
constitutes an unsustainable judicial activism, and concluding that "the present
jurisprudence holds the promise to be an enduring and constructive one, for its aims and
means differ significantly from those of prior eras").
189. Such a rule would also follow from the Court's decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991), and the Eleventh Amendment doctrine on waivers of sovereign
immunity. See supra note 53 (discussing the fate of such challenges to the Telecom Act).
190. The concept of "lock-in" tracks a well-developed economic literature and antitrust
doctrine. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465-78
(1992); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 103-39 (1999).
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In the face of constitutional attacks upon cooperative federalism
programs like the Telecom Act, the Supreme Court will confront
some critical issues that will help to determine whether such programs
can survive (and in what form). If the Court intervenes not only to
ensure a basic exit right, but to limit the ability of the federal
government to bargain with states (i.e., to use its carrots and sticks), it
may undermine the ability of the federal government and the states to
reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Alternatively, if despite
federal supremacy, the Supreme Court prevents states from relying
on federal authority under all circumstances in the name of state
sovereignty, states might then become far less attractive partners to
the federal jurisdiction. 19'
IV. A THREE-DIMENSIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
Constructing a constitutional architecture for cooperative
federalism requires a new vision not only of federal-state relations,
but also of the nature of separation of powers law. Traditionally,
separations of powers debates have focused almost entirely on
disputes among the federal branches of government or between the
federal government and the states.'92 When analyzing such questions,
commentators tend to fall into one of two camps: formalists or
functionalists. 9 3  The formalists tend to emphasize the original
191. The permutations of this anomaly are multifold. It is conceivable, for example,
that lawsuits will challenge not simply the validity of the eminent domain power, but also
the adequacy of just compensation required to collocate physically in an incumbent's
central office. Such a suit would raise the difficult question of whether an order to allow
physical collocation would subject state agencies, the FCC, or both to damage liability. Cf.
PETER W. HUBER, ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: A SPECIAL
REPORT 18 (1996) ("[1]f the states do not respect incumbent LECs' entitlement to just
compensation for intrastate collocation services, the Federal Treasury may find itself liable
for the deficit on a theory that the taking has been authorized by federal authority.").
192. See, e.g., Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 918-23 (1996) (noting the horizontal and
vertical dimensions to separation of powers).
193. As always, relying on labels to capture the essence of different positions is fraught
with difficulty. Thus, the formalist-functionalist typology should not be viewed as
presenting fixed categories. Professors Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, for
example, appear to employ a functionalist justification for unitary executive theory,
though their version of the doctrine is more nuanced than the leading formalists (and
representatives of the unitary position), as they do not believe that all agencies must
necessarily report to and be subject to removal by the President. See Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108-12
(1994) (suggesting that the Independent Counsel Act and the Federal Reserve's insulation
from executive oversight pass muster and that the Court should enforce the unitary
executive principle by requiring a clear statement that an agency should be independent of
the President); see also William N. Eskridge, Relationships Between Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 29 (1998)
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understanding of the Presidency and largely endorse the theory of a
unitary executive. In contrast, functionalists tend to accept the
emergence of novel arrangements to maintain a balance of power in
the modem administrative state. Few courts or commentators,
however, have carefully developed a third dimension of separations
of powers jurisprudence that would govern delegations of power by
the executive branch or Congress to state agencies; accordingly, few
formalists or functionalists have evaluated the constitutionality of
such delegations. 9 4 Such a jurisprudence, which will undoubtedly be
required as a result of the emerging cooperative federalism, will
ultimately give rise to a new "three dimensional" separations of
powers jurisprudence.
A. The Horizontal Separation of Powers Debate
The textual basis for the functionalist-formalist debate over
separation of powers questions stems largely from Article II's
Vesting' 9 and Take Care' 96 Clauses. In particular, the Constitution
provides that "[t]he Executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America""9 who "shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."'9 These commands, which do not specify
how the executive must "take Care" of the faithful execution of the
laws, leave considerable room for disagreement. Not surprisingly, the
formalist-functionalist debate has thrived, with formalists taking the
position that the President's control of administration must be
supreme and with functionalists maintaining that the Constitution
(suggesting the relationship between these two approaches is not fixed); M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation In Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1129
(2000) (arguing that these two approaches do not appropriately capture the real issues).
194. See Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal
Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (1997) ("Almost lost in this federalism debate is the
fact that these congressional efforts to induce or coerce state administration of federal law
implicate intriguing and difficult separation of powers principles."); Hills, Constitutional
Context, supra note 159, at 183 ("[I]t is fair to say that the Court has not fully explored the
implications of cooperative federalism for the rest of its constitutional jurisprudence.
Non-federal implementation of federal law has slipped into American constitutional
practice with relatively little theoretical explanation or justification."); Neil Kinkopf, Of
Devolution, Privatization and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L.J.
331, 333 (1998) ("[C]ommentators have paid scant attention to the issue of what, if any,
limits the constitutional separation of powers imposes on the divestment of federal
power.").
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
198. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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leaves considerable room for flexible arrangements between the
branches. 199
The formalists and the functionalists each see a different purpose
to separation of powers doctrine. The formalists contend that
accountability of each political actor represents the central value of
separation of powers doctrine. ° Thus, for most formalists, protecting
executive accountability trumps all other values, including the
protection of balance between the branches. 2 1 The functionalists, by
contrast, emphasize the importance of balance between the branches,
justifying innovations such as the legislative veto on that ground.2'
Despite the raging formalist-functionalist debate for the past fifteen
years in both the courts and the law reviews, neither side can claim
victory or readily concede defeat.2 3
199. The Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 17, presents another
potential separation of powers limit on congressional delegation of federal authority to
state officials. In the case of cooperative federalism programs, however, the Supreme
Court has not expressed concern with the bypassing of federal appointment authority in
the implementation of federal law. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-61 (1982).
In short, state agency officials implementing federal law cannot be said to serve pursuant
to federal law, even if they are implementing federal law and are justified in acting based
on federal authority. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (holding that the
Appointments Clause is implicated only where an official serves pursuant to federal law);
see also Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pac. N.W. Elec. Power & Conservations Planning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that officials on an interstate
compact council implementing federal law do not "serve pursuant to federal law" and thus
that their appointment by states does not violate the Appointments Clause).
200. Because the formalists tend to stress the centrality of a unitary executive, they are
often referred to as "unitarians."
201. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1741 (1996).
202. See, e.g., id. at 1737 (explaining that the Constitution allows the legislative and
executive branches to share authority in creative ways).
203. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994) ("After two hundred years, no scholarly
or judicial consensus has yet emerged on this vital question of the proper scope of
presidential power."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separations of
Powers, 1991 SUP. Cr. REv. 225, 226 ("The Court has alternated between the formal and
the functional constructions, with a swing group of Justices evidently happy to embrace
one or the other as suits the needs of the moment."); id. at 227 ("[N]either formalism nor
functionalism provides a satisfactory account of the constitutional principle of separation
of powers-at least as it operates in practice."). This debate has proceeded on textual,
historical, and policy lines with the participants each confidently proclaiming the rightness
of their viewpoint on each score. Compare, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 201, at 1755 ("[A]
genuine reconstruction of the Founding belies the contention that the Founders either
always or primarily viewed the doctrine of separation of powers in modern formalist
terms."), with Calabresi & Prakash, supra, at 663 ("The pre-ratification history fully
supports [the formalist view] and little in the post-ratification history calls [it] into
question.").
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The current formalist-functionalist debate and the lack of a
judicial consensus can overshadow the extent to which the Supreme
Court has rejected the formalist position that the modem
administrative state is unconstitutional. The Court faced this
question in Humphrey's Executor v. United States2° and rejected
President Roosevelt's argument that the executive branch retains
inherent authority to remove all executive officials at will. 5 In so
doing, the New Deal Court set forth a separation of powers
jurisprudence that accepted the administrative state and protected
congressional prerogatives from the potential power that a modern
executive could wield in a new era. More recently, the Court's ruling
in Morrison v. Olson2°  again rejected the formalist position,
concluding that the Independent Counsel Statute2°  passed
constitutional muster despite its limitations on executive control of
the independent counsel's prosecutorial function.2 "
Formalists and functionalists continue to debate whether the
focus of modem separation of powers law should be on protecting
Congress from executive aggregation or protecting the President from
congressional encroachment on his or her prerogatives. Reflecting
their particular brand of originalism, many formalists view the lesson
of the founding-the need for a strong executive to offset the strength
and ambitions of the legislature-as one that should guide today's
separation of powers doctrine.2°9 Functionalists, on the other hand,
might invoke either Professor Lessig's theory of translation or
Professor Dworkin's concept/conception dichotomy as an alternative
to a mechanistic application of the Framers' intent.2 10 According to
204. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
205. See id. at 626-29. Although the New Deal Court appeared to protect legislative
prerogatives by enforcing the "nondelegation doctrine," see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388,418 (1935), this doctrine has not been used since. But see American Trucking Ass'n v.
U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invoking the non-delegation doctrine to
overturn federal regulation), cert. granted by Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n, 120 S.
Ct. 2003 (2000).
206. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
207. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat.
1293.
208. Id. at 696-97. Highlighting the significance of this ruling, Dean Sullivan has
suggested that the "Court's recent separations-of-powers decisions have tended toward
the functional analysis." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78,94 (1995).
209. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23,47 (1994).
210. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 493 (1987) ("[Tlhe federal government and the executive branch in particular
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Lessig's translation theory, the challenge of constitutional
interpretation is to "translate" the norm of separation of powers into
a new reality that differed from that at the time of the Founding, an
approach that could justify a different outcome at different times on a
question such as the constitutionality of the legislative veto.2 '
Alternatively, Professor Dworkin's concept versus conception
distinction might help to explain that the Founders had a concept of
separation of powers that required balance among the branches
("ambition shall counteract ambition," as Madison put it 12), but did
not necessarily require that later generations follow their specific
conception of guarding the executive from legislative
encroachment
13
B. A Three Dimensional Separation of Powers World?
For either the formalist or functionalist, three dimensions for
separations of powers may be too much. A doctrine governing
horizontal (legislative-executive) arrangements and vertical (federal-
state) ones has been well recognized as serving important
constitutional purposes. It remains an open question, however,
whether a third dimension-federal legislative-state executive and
federal executive-state executive-will soon take root. The core
challenge to any delegation to state agencies stems from the concern
that the implementation of federal law must ultimately reflect the
judgments of the federal executive branch.
Where a federal agency enjoys residual authority to override
state decisions and state agencies voluntarily accept the delegation of
authority, separation of powers concerns should not bar delegation of
executive authority to state agencies. By contrast, Printz anticipated
and appeared to reject the proposition that Congress could delegate
federal executive authority, without federal executive oversight, to
state officials against their will because such delegation would violate
Article II.2I4 Although Justice Scalia commented in Printz that state
consent to a delegation of federal authority would mitigate Article II
concerns,21 5 the rationale behind this version of an anti-delegation
have changed so dramatically since the founding that 'framers' intent' cannot be
mechanically applied as if it settles the matter.").
211. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 193, at 103-04.
212. THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 33 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
213. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-72 (1986) (explaining the concept
versus conception approach to constitutional interpretation).
214. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (suggesting that such a
delegation would shatter the unity of the presidency and reduce its power).
215. See id. at 923 n.12 (suggesting possible separation of powers concerns, but noting
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argument would preclude all federal delegations of executive
authority to state officials.216 Conversely, if a federal agency enjoyed
residual authority to take back any delegation to state agencies
(which it did not in Printz), even many formalists would not object on
Article II grounds-the President's authority to execute and take care
of the execution of the laws would remain intact.217
Where a federal agency lacked the authority to oversee the
implementation of federal law, many formalists would object on the
same grounds that they find independent agencies antithetical to
separation of powers principles. As Professors Calabresi and Prakash
put it, "[t]he Executive Power Clause grants 'the executive power'
solely and exclusively to the President; it gives Congress no power
whatsoever to create subordinate entities that may exercise 'the
executive Power' until and unless the President delegates that power
in some fashion. 2 18 Consequently, they maintain that any effort to
delegate federal executive authority to a state agency would be
subject to presidential nullification.2 9
Finally, even some functionalists might conclude that the
enlistment of state agencies to execute federal law, without federal
agency oversight, would bend our constitutional scheme too far. As
Professor Martin Flaherty put it, judicial intervention into separation
that they are "significantly reduced" if state agency role in federal scheme is voluntary).
216. See id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Caminker, Limits of Formalism, supra note
151, at 230-31 ("Arguably, the requirement of presidential supervision should run to all
forms of state administration of federal programs, even when the state voluntarily enacts
state regulations designed specifically to serve federal objectives or satisfy federal
standards."); Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 855 ("After all, every such
program of cooperative federalism deprives the President of power to execute the laws
just as much as congressional 'commandeering' of state governments."); Kinkopf, supra
note 194, at 381 ("[It is impossible to understand why it should matter [for purposes of
separation of powers analysis] whether the nonfederal actor decided voluntarily to accept
the administrative function or whether the nonfederal actor was forced to accept the
function.").
217. As long as the President (or the executive agency under supervision) makes the
delegation (and can take it back), formalists would conclude that the arrangement satisfies
the separation of powers requirements. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 203, at 595
(contending that the exercise of federal executive power requires Presidential delegation
and oversight); see also Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 3 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 231, 231 (1979) ("[S]o long as the President retains the authority to withdraw
power once delegated, as he has done here, his prerogatives under Article II, § 2, cI. 2, to
select and control those who will implement Federal law is preserved."). In fact, Calabresi
and Prakash conclude that where a statute purports to delegate unreviewable authority to
state agencies, the President inherently enjoys the authority to withdraw a delegation of
federal executive authority. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 203, at 639.
218. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 203, at 581.
219. Id. at 639 ("[T]he President can refuse to allow a state officer to exercise the
federal executive power, just as he can refuse to permit a purely federal officer to do so.").
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of powers questions is justified when a court finds "a compelling
violation of one of the basic values of balance, joint accountability, or
sufficient energy."20 Although it is possible that some functionalists
would thus find federal delegation to state agencies problematic on
accountability grounds, most functionalists will find the innovations
of cooperative federalism statutes to be an appropriate response to
the modem administrative state.2'1
C. Towards a New Dimension of Separation of Powers
Whether justified by the textual commitment to federalism or by
a functionalist appreciation of the need to counteract executive
control of administrative lawmaking, courts and commentators will
increasingly evaluate when state agencies can implement federal law.
As noted above, a particularly challenging question in this regard is
whether state agency implementation of federal law without federal
agency oversight violates Article II and separation of powers
principles. This issue, while not given center stage (or stage right, for
that matter), underpinned the debate in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board' over how to construe the Telecom Act. Although the case
nominally turned on how to construe the Act's jurisdictional
provisions, the allocation of federal authority to state agencies, as
urged by the states, raised an interesting Article II question.
Although the majority did not engage in the debate as such, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
suggested in dissent that even some formalists might judge such
delegations as constitutionalY2
1. The Formalist Justification
In considering the nature of federal-state relations under the
Telecom Act, Iowa Utilities Board evaluated, albeit implicitly,
whether a regime where states implemented federal law without
federal agency oversight was sensible and constitutionally
permissible. In particular, the states argued that the Act called for
exclusive state oversight over the proper pricing methodology for
access to the local telephone network because, in that area, Congress
220. Flaherty, supra note 201, at 1828.
221. See Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 141, at 816 (proposing a functionalist
approach to cooperative federalism and criticizing the formalist approach of dual
sovereignty).
222. 525 U.S. 366 (1998).
223. Id at 402 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
trusted the state agencies and not the FCC.224 By concluding that the
Act left the FCC with complete residual authority to implement all of
its terms (including the pricing standard for unbundled network
elements), the Court sidestepped the question of whether
unreviewable state implementation of federal law passes
constitutional muster.2
In dissent, Justice Thomas addressed the constitutional issues
implicated in state administration of federal law head on, concluding
that there is no "principle of federal law that prohibits the States from
interpreting and applying federal law" and that it is, in fact, well
settled that they can, provided that they do so voluntarily. 26 To
justify state agency exercise of federal executive authority, Justice
Thomas invoked the constitutional significance of federalism,
suggesting that "basic principles of federalism compel us to presume
that the States are competent" to act in this area.27 In so doing,
Justice Thomas aligned himself with Professor Harold Krent, who has
suggested that delegations of federal executive authority to states can
be justified as "furthering the federalism values in our constitutional
framework" and thus are sufficient to "override the Article II interest
in exclusive executive control of administrative authority." 22
224. Id. at 384-85.
225. The majority opinion chose to put "constitutional impediments aside," ruling on
statutory interpretation grounds, in part because the Court was "aware of no similar
instances in which federal policymaking has been turned over to state administrative
agencies," let alone without federal agency oversight. Id. at 385 n.10. In so doing, the
opinion did not even invoke the interpretive canon that courts should construe statutes to
avoid constitutional difficulties. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)
("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our
duty is to adopt the latter." (internal citations omitted)). It is worth noting, in this regard,
that the majority was well aware of the separations of power issues that lurked in this case.
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, When Congress Plays Telephone, AM. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 72,73
(noting Justice Ginsberg's comment at oral argument that the States' argument
contemplated a "truly novel regime, one in which a federal law being administered with
'no federal executive presence' in the scheme").
226. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883)).
227. Id. at 411 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. L. REv. 62, 83-84
(1990); id. at 106 ("Almost by definition, delegations to state governments and Indian
tribes embody federalism principles .... Rather than decide what is best for the Indian
Tribes and states concerning matters of local interests, Congress ... [by delegating
authority] to states, municipal governments, and Indian Tribes allow[s] citizens to have a
more direct voice in shaping federal policies that touch their lives."). The Sixth Circuit's
resolution of this issue appears to rely on a similar line of reasoning. See Ky. Div.,
Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20
[Vol. 79
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Justice Thomas's dissent in Iowa Utilities Board also referenced
history and precedent to justify the delegation of federal executive
authority to state agencies. In particular, he quoted at length from
United States v. Jones,-9 in which the Court observed that" 'from the
time of its establishment that government has been in the habit of
using, with the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and
institutions as its agents.' ",,n Indeed, the historical pedigree of
delegation of federal power to state officials dates back to the
Supreme Court's acceptance of delegating federal prosecutorial
discretion to state prosecutors in Houston v. Moore.-3 As Professor
Krent has explained, this practice long ago established the legitimacy
of assigning the administration of federal law to state officials beyond
executive control.32
Finally, by highlighting that the states are interpreting and
applying federal law, Justice Thomas did not leave himself much
room to suggest that the federal Telecom Act simply constrains the
state agencies from acting under state law-an interpretation that
might avoid the separation of powers dilemma of delegating
unreviewable federal executive authority to a state agency. Professor
Evan Caminker, in confronting the separation of powers question
raised by cooperative federalism regimes like the Telecom Act,
offered this solution, suggesting that state administration merely
involves the development of interstitial state law that need not be
reviewed by the federal executive.'3 3 This explanation, however, is
unsatisfactory on several grounds, at least with regard to the Telecom
Act: it does not fit with federal judicial review of state agency
decisions;- 4 it does not explain why the federal act would explicitly
preserve state authority to supplement federal law; 35 and it does not
F.3d 1406, 1417 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the delegation of authority to states
"[r]ather than violate the separation of powers principle ... in fact furthers another core
constitutional value-that of federalism").
229. 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
230. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1883)).
231. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
232. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcemen" Some
Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. RaV. 275, 303 (1989). This practice has continued
through this century. See, e.g., Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 314-16 (1927)
(upholding state trooper executed arrests under the National Prohibition Act-which
"contemplated some cooperation between the state and federal governments in its
enforcement"-without any direction from federal law enforcement officials).
233. Caminker, Limits of Formalism, supra note 151, at 231.
234. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. IV 1998).
235. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
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justify state implementation of federal law that it is not otherwise
authorized to apply.-36
For formalists like Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Professor Krent, the federalism justification, along with the fact that
Congress is not assuming executive authority, provides an important
formal distinction to avoid the Article II concern set forth in Printz.
For Justice Scalia, the need for a unitary executive may well be
categorical and not subject to being balanced against or distinguished
by the presence of countervailing factors. 37 Indeed, in Morrison v.
Olson, 8 Justice Scalia dissented on this ground, noting that the
presence of formal removal power (which he rightly noted was highly
unlikely ever to be exercised) could not justify Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position that the Independent Counsel law did not
violate Article II.23 Thus, if Morrison's acceptance of formal
distinctions and a balancing of competing interests proves to be a
guide for future separation of powers decisions, Justice Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist may well conclude that delegations to state
agencies, even without federal agency review, pass constitutional
muster. Justice Scalia, by contrast, may once again carry the unitary
executive flag in dissent and insist upon a categorical vision of federal
executive power.24
2. The Functionalist Justification
In addition to preserving state agency discretion, congressional
authorization of selected statutory provisions solely to states also
serves Congress's purpose of keeping executive authority in check
and promoting vertical competition between federal, state, and local
236. See supra Part II.
237. Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-federalism and Nationalism on the
Rehnquist Court, 31 RuTGERS L.J. 741, 746 (2000) (describing Justice Scalia's formalism
as aligned with a reliance on categorical rules).
238. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
239. Id. at 703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Alternatively, the Court could follow
Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn's suggestion that "Chadha's reliance on the very specific
statements of the Framers is ahistorical, given the vast changes in United States
government in the modem administrative state. Those changes ... suggest the superiority
of an understanding of the Framers' expectations that is pitched at a more general level."
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,
527 (1992).
240. In so doing, Justice Scalia would follow the approach of Judge Jerry Jones, who
recently concluded that 7qui tam actions violate the Take Care Clause. See Riley v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514,530 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Congress cannot be delegating
to relators the President's power and duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,




agencies. Particularly in implementing complex statutes such as the
Telecom Act, Congress may wish to put federal agencies (and
executive branch officials) on notice that it can invite state
participation as a substitute for federal executive implementation. As
Professor Hills put it, "intergovernmental competition is useful,
because it allows Congress to bypass federal officials who fail to
implement federal policy faithfully and instead to delegate power to
other nonfederal officials who demonstrate greater fidelity to federal
policies." 241  Moreover, such a system uses interjurisdictional
competition to keep each jurisdiction on its toes, encouraging each to
be more efficient and responsive in carrying out its objectives.242
For the functionalist, the involvement of state agencies might
well be appealing for the same reasons as the legislative veto, namely
that it provides an innovative structural solution to address the
challenge of keeping executive authority in check.243 Such measures
may be particularly justified in the modem administrative state, in
which Congress delegates considerable authority to the federal
executive branch to implement complex cooperative federalism
statutes like the Telecom Act.2 4 Indeed, one could view delegations
to state agencies as an alternate means of capturing some of the
benefits of the legislative veto, which was Congress's first strategy for
241. Hills, Dissecting the State, supra note 5, at 1204; see Hills, Cooperative Federalism,
supra note 141, at 883 ("The history of cooperative federalism is, in part, a history of
struggles between elected policy generalists-mayors, governors, state legislatures, and
city councils-and federal agency specialists for greater control over federal programs,
with Congress favoring one or another type of organization depending on the political
climate and perceived regulatory needs."); ills, Constitutional Context, supra note 159, at
187 ("The ability to choose [federal or state agencies to implement federal law] increases
Congress' power to insure faithful execution of its laws.").
242. VINCENT OsTRow, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC:
DESIGNING THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 130 (1987) ("A highly federalized system of
administration takes advantage of overlapping jurisdictions to generate competitive
pressures toward increasing efficiency and responsiveness in the operation of service-
delivery systems."); see id. at 136 ("The power of a buyer is significantly enhanced if the
buyer can act through the collective agency of an association in bargaining with a
monopolist or with the freedom to choose from the services provided by several potential
monopolists who compete with each other for the favor of a common clientele in
overlapping markets."); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917,
918 (1985) ("Political competition among jurisdictions-vertically between national and
state governments and horizontally among state and local governments-is often a healthy
antidote to monopoly.").
243. See Flaherty, supra note 201, at 1834 (suggesting that functionalists should
applaud legislative efforts to balance executive authority).
244. Id. at 1820 ("With the New Deal, and the attendant death of the nondelegation
doctrine, the giveaway of what had been seen as legislative authority (or something close)
became massive."); id. at 1827 ("In its first year of publication, significantly 1939, the CFR
consisted of sixteen volumes; last year it had expanded to 200 volumes.").
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
responding to the growth of executive power in the modem
administrative state.245 Significantly, this innovation would not
include the step of aggrandizing its own power (via a legislative veto)
in order to address the enhancement of executive branch authority.246
Ironically, some formalists may accept the functional explanation
that the "innovation" of delegating executive authority to state
agencies represents a tolerable remedy to the initial constitutionally
questionable step of tolerating broad delegations to administrative
agencies. 47 Indeed, in a world where even many formalists accept the
realities of the modem administrative state and appear disinclined to
support a robust nondelegation doctrine,24 some formalists may
ultimately conclude that they owe it to the legislative branch to
tolerate innovations that involve a new dimension in separation of
powers yet do not implicate the infirmities of a legislative veto
solution.249 Any other resolution of the issue would put Congress in
245. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-75 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(documenting the enactment of statutes containing legislative vetoes, the earliest of which
was enacted in 1932).
246. See Hills, Constitutional Context, supra note 159, at 190 ("The beauty of
cooperative federalism, from a constitutional perspective, is that it gives Congress a way to
achieve the faithful execution of the laws that minimally compromises the independence
of the executive officials from Congress."); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 193, at 114
(explaining that the significant difference between cases invalidated on separation of
powers grounds and those which passed constitutional muster is that in the former cases
"Congress attempted to give itself a degree of ongoing authority over the administration
of the laws"). In this sense, reliance on state agencies represents just the type of
innovation that Professor Ackerman may have in mind when he calls on constitutionalists
to "extend their thinking to embrace the distinctive structural problems involved in
controlling the fourth branch of government: the bureaucracy." Bruce Ackerman, The
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 634,691 (2000).
247. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 239, at 533 ("[TIn the modem administrative
state[,] most 'lawmaking' is accomplished by agencies under the authority of statutory
delegations."); Greene, supra note 150, at 124 ("[I]f we accept sweeping delegations of
lawmaking power to the President, then to capture accurately the framers' principles-
principles that deserve our continuing adherence-we must also accept some (though not
all) congressional efforts at regulating presidential lawmaking.").
248. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court, over a lone
dissent by Justice Scalia, concluded that the delegation of lawmaking authority to the
Sentencing Commission passed constitutional muster under the nondelegation doctrine.
Id at 374. In so doing, the Court explained that "in an increasingly complex society
Congress obviously could not perform its functions absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general principles," and virtually any broad principle passes the
constitutional standard. Id. at 372-73; see also OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r of Wage &
Hour Div., Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (observing that "[iln an increasingly
complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions" without delegating
details of regulatory scheme to executive agency).
249. Significantly, an assignment of interpretive authority to state agencies does not
transgress the "anti-aggrandizement" principle that prohibits Congress from arrogating
non-legislative powers to itself (such as with the legislative veto). See Kinkopf, supra note
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an uncomfortable position: relinquish more authority to the federal
executive branch or limit the subjects on which it legislates.20
Finally, a tolerance for delegating authority to state agencies
without federal agency oversight would grant Congress important
latitude in designing cooperative federalism statutes. Without such
toleration, only federal agencies will be able to determine what issues
should be left to state agency discretion, thereby entrusting the
executive branch with a judgment that Congress may itself wish to
make in certain situations. Moreover, Congress may also choose to
employ variations on this scenario, including a "springing grant of
residual authority" that would only authorize federal agency
rulemaking at a future time in order to allow for "percolation" of
different approaches to a particular issue. In short, as with a
restrictive approach to when state agencies can administer federal
law, a requirement that federal executive agencies must be able to
oversee state implementation of federal law will hinder the
development of cooperative federalism regulatory programs.
CONCLUSION
With many cooperative federalism programs firmly in place and
new initiatives on the drawing board, the Supreme Court would take
a radical step if it undermined the very foundation of such programs.
Nonetheless, courts and commentators cannot assume without
developing a principled framework that cooperative federalism
programs rest on a solid foundation. Under a reverse-Erie
framework that balances federal supremacy and state autonomy,
states can embrace the importance of state administration of federal
law while protecting state autonomy through the valid excuse
doctrine and an anti-commandeering principle structured around the
exit, voice, and loyalty model. In a similar acknowledgement of the
importance of cooperative federalism, the Supreme Court should
make clear that our constitutional commitment to federalism and
effective governance justifies state agency administration of federal
law not subject to federal agency review.
In setting forth the legal architecture for cooperative federalism,
the Supreme Court should acknowledge the benefits and historical
194, at 347 (noting that this principle "has no application to assignments outside the
federal government").
250. See Flaherty, supra note 201, at 1827 ("[D]elegation may have come about
because the world became too complicated for Congress to handle alone, but it also
enabled Congress to address more than it ever otherwise would have on its own.").
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pedigree of state administration of federal law. In so doing, it should
afford states the ability to adopt a reverse-Erie approach to
evaluating their authority to implement federal law and should craft
Tenth Amendment and separations of powers doctrines that endorse
the model of cooperative federalism. If the Court rejects this path
and insists on a clean separation of federal and state authority,
Congress may eventually confront the difficult task of designing new
regulatory regimes without the ability to rely on the states as partners,
ultimately leaving the states with less authority to implement key
regulatory programs.
